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THE NEED FOR A RESEARCH CULTURE IN THE
FORENSIC SCIENCES
*
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Jonathan J. Koehler, Glenn Langenburg, D. Michel Risinger,
Norah Rudin, Jay Siegel, and David A. Stoney
The methods, techniques, and reliability of the forensic sciences in general,
and the pattern identification disciplines in particular, have faced significant
scrutiny in recent years. Critics have attacked the scientific basis for the
assumptions and claims made by forensic scientists both in and out of the
courtroom. Defenders have emphasized courts’ long-standing acceptance of
forensic science evidence, the relative dearth of known errors, and the skill and
experience of practitioners. This Article reflects an effort made by a diverse
group of participants in these debates, including law professors, academics from
several disciplines, and practicing forensic scientists, to find and explore common
ground. To what extent do the forensic sciences need to change in order to place
st
themselves on an appropriately secure foundation in the 21 century? We all
*
Jennifer L. Mnookin, Professor of Law, Founding Co-Director of the Program on Law,
Science, and Evidence (PULSE), UCLA School of Law; Simon A. Cole, Associate Professor,
Department of Criminology, Law & Society, UC Irvine; Itiel E. Dror, Researcher, Institute of
Cognitive Neuroscience, University College, London, and Principal Consultant, Cognitive
Consultants International (CCI); Barry A. J. Fisher, Crime Laboratory Director (retired), Los
Angeles County Sherriff’s Department; Max M. Houck, Director, Forensic Science Initiative,
Research Office, and Director, Forensic Business Research and Development, College of Business
and Economics, West Virginia University; Keith Inman, Assistant Professor of Criminal Justice
Administration, Cal State East Bay and Senior Criminalist, Forensic Analytical Sciences, Inc.;
David H. Kaye, Distinguished Professor and Weiss Family Scholar, Dickinson School of Law, and
Graduate Faculty, Forensic Science Program, Eberly College of Science, Penn State University;
Jonathan J. Koehler, Beatrice Kuhn Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law;
Glenn Langenburg, Forensic Scientist, Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension Forensic
Science Services; D. Michael Risinger, John J. Gibbons Professor of Law, Seton Hall University
School of Law; Norah Rudin, Forensic DNA Consultant; Jay Siegel, Chair, Department of
Chemistry and Chemical Biology and Director, Forensic and Investigative Sciences Program,
Indiana University-Purdue University; David A. Stoney, Chief Scientist, Stoney Forensic, Inc.
This Article grew out of a conference held at UCLA School of Law in February 2010 under
the auspices of PULSE. We thank the UCLA School of Law and the A. Barry & Lorri Cappello
Fund for funding this event. We also thank Forrest Havens and Julie Nicholson for helpful
research assistance. Special thanks to Jerry Kang for his extraordinary mindmapping of the
authors’ working session during the conference. We would also like to thank the additional
participants in the PULSE symposium, as well as the thoughtful commentators who have
responded to this Article in this issue.

1

58:3

Mnookin et al

Mnookin Final Proof 1

(1/12/2011 3:41:00 PM)

2

DRAFT: Do not cite
firmly agree that the traditional forensic sciences in general, and the pattern
identification disciplines, such as fingerprint, firearm, tool mark and handwriting
identification evidence in particular, do not currently possess—and absolutely
must develop—a well-established scientific foundation. This can only be
accomplished through the development of a research culture that permeates the
entire field of forensic science. A research culture, we argue, must be grounded
in the values of empiricism, transparency, and a commitment to an ongoing
critical perspective. The forensic science disciplines need to substantially increase
their commitment to evidence from empirical research as the basis for their
conclusions. Sound research, rather than experience, training, and longstanding
use, must become the central method by which assertions are justified. In this
Article, we describe the underdeveloped research culture in the non-DNA
forensic sciences, offer suggestions for how it might be improved, and explain
why it matters.
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INTRODUCTION
Long-used types of forensic science—fingerprint examination,
handwriting analysis, firearms and toolmark comparison, and other forms of
pattern and impression evidence—are mainstays of criminal prosecution.
For roughly a hundred years, these comparison and identification methods
have regularly and routinely been employed as legal evidence. For most of
that period, courts, attorneys, jurors, and the public, as well as forensic
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analysts themselves, have largely accepted this evidence as trustworthy and
uncontroversial.
In the last few years, the situation has changed dramatically. These
methods and techniques now face more criticism and scrutiny than ever
1
before.
Latent fingerprint identification, questioned document
examination, and firearms comparison have been the targets of numerous
admissibility challenges. Defendants have argued that this evidence is
insufficiently valid to be admissible under Daubert v. Merrell Dow
2
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., and insufficiently accepted by the relevant scientific
3
community to be admissible under Frye v. United States. While most courts
have continued to admit these forms of evidence, forensic practitioners
have found themselves in the spotlight, forced to justify and defend
4
Meanwhile, scandals
practices that had previously evaded scrutiny.
1.
A latent fingerprint is an impression left by a finger (or, more precisely, by friction
ridge skin) on a surface. Latent prints are commonly recovered from crime scenes.
2.
509 U.S. 579 (1993). The Court, in an opinion by Justice Blackmun, held that the
Federal Rules of Evidence required judges confronted with a challenge to scientific evidence to
engage in a “flexible” inquiry whose “overarching subject is the scientific validity—and thus the
evidentiary relevance and reliability—of the principles that underlie a proposed submission.” Id.
at 594–95. The Court elaborated on Daubert’s approach in General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S.
136 (1997), which reaffirmed the Court’s commitment to trial court gatekeeping and made clear
that the appellate standard for review of the trial court’s admissibility decisions was abuse of
discretion. In Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, the Court held that the district court’s gatekeeping
obligations extended to all forms of expert evidence and that judicial evaluation of reliability of
expert evidence should focus on the particular task at issue in the specific case rather than the
general validity of a field of expertise writ large. 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999).
3.
293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). Frye’s key and oft-quoted language states:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the experimental
and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the
evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a long way
in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or
discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to
have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.
Id. at 1014 (emphasis added). With any given forensic science, if the particular field, such as
firearms comparison, is defined narrowly to consist only of firearms examiners, general acceptance
cannot be in doubt. If the field is defined more broadly to include experts in all forms of pattern
analysis, statisticians, and computer scientists, then the answer becomes less obvious. See, e.g., 1
DANIEL L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT
TESTIMONY § 1:5, at 12–13 (2009–2010 ed.); DAVID H. KAYE, DAVID BERNSTEIN & JENNIFER L.
MNOOKIN: THE NEW WIGMORE: EXPERT EVIDENCE § 6.3.3(b) (2d ed. forthcoming 2010); Simon
A. Cole, Out of the Daubert Fire and Into the Fryeing Pan? Self-Validation, Meta-Expertise and the
Admissibility of Latent Print Evidence in Frye Jurisdictions, 9 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 453 (2008).
In addition, many Frye states have inched towards a partial inquiry into validity. See 1 PAUL C.
GIANNELLI & EDWARD J. IMWINKELREID, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 1.11, at 67 (2007); KAYE,
BERNSTEIN & MNOOKIN, supra, § 7.4.2(b).
4.
For a recent look at the variety of judicial reactions to these forms of evidence, see
generally, KAYE, BERNSTEIN & MNOOKIN, supra note 3, § 15 (collecting cases); Jennifer L.
Mnookin, The Courts, the NAS, and the Future of Forensic Science, 75 BROOK. L. REV.
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involving crime laboratories have rippled across the nation: from Los
Angeles to Charlotte, from Oklahoma City to Houston, stories of
carelessness, bias, incompetence, excessive coziness with prosecutors, and
other embarrassing revelations have raised doubts about the trustworthiness
and accuracy of some reported findings in a disturbing number of
5
laboratories. In 2004, the American fingerprint community faced its most
public fingerprint error ever when several highly experienced FBI examiners
erroneously linked Oregon attorney (and Muslim convert) Brandon
6
Mayfield to a fingerprint associated with the Madrid train bombing. One
(forthcoming 2010). Handwriting evidence has received a more ambivalent reception than
fingerprint identification or firearms comparison. See D. Michael Risinger, Cases Involving the
Reliability of Handwriting Identification Expertise Since the Decision in Daubert, 43 TULSA L. REV. 477
(2007).
5.
Over the last twenty years, serious concerns have arisen in crime laboratories across the
country, including in Boston, Chicago, Detroit, Houston, Los Angeles, New York, North
Carolina, Oklahoma, San Francisco, and West Virginia, as well as at the FBI laboratory. KAYE,
BERNSTEIN & MNOOKIN, supra note 3, § 1.4.1(a). For examples from the voluminous press on
these scandals, see JOHN F. KELLY & PHILLIP K. WEARNE, TAINTING EVIDENCE: INSIDE THE
SCANDALS AT THE FBI CRIME LAB (1998); Tina Daunt, LAPD Blames Faulty Training in DNA
Snafu, L.A. TIMES, July 31, 2002 (discussing the LAPD’s accidental destruction of rape kits);
Lianne Hart, DNA Lab’s Woes Cast Doubt on 68 Prison Terms, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2003
(discussing the Houston crime lab scandal); Mandy Locke & Joseph Neff, Inspectors Failed to Find
SBI Faults, CHARLOTTES OBSERVER, Aug. 26, 2010; Moises Mendoza, HPD Fingerprinting Trouble
Not Unique, HOUSTON CHRON., Dec. 13 2009 (giving context to Houston fingerprint lab
problems); Steve Mills & Maurice Possley, Report Alleges Crime Lab Fraud: Scientist Is Accused of
Providing False Testimony, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 14, 2001 (discussing the Pamela Fish scandal in
Chicago); Maggie Mulvihill & Franci Richardson, Unfit Cops Put in Key Evidence Unit; Fingerprint
Handlers Were All Thumbs, BOSTON HERALD, May 7, 2004; Maurice Possley, Steve Mills & Flynn
McRoberts, Scandal Touches Even Elite Labs: Flawed Work, Resistance to Scrutiny Seen Across U.S.,
CHI. TRIB., Oct. 21, 2004; Jonathan Saltzman & John R. Ellement, Mass. DNA Lab’s Lapses Draw
Beacon Hill Inquiry: Delays, Errors Laid to Lack of Oversight, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 17, 2007
(discussing the Massachusetts state crime lab scandal); Ben Schmitt & Joe Swickard, Troubled
Detroit Police Crime Lab Shuttered: State Police Audit Results ‘Appalling,’ Wayne County Prosecutor
Declares, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Sept. 26, 2008 (discussing the multiple problems that led to the
Detroit crime lab’s closure); Jaxon Van Derbeken, SFPD Drug-Test Technician Accused of
Skimming, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 10, 2010 (discussing the San Francisco crime lab scandal); Murray
Weiss, Criminal Errors, N.Y. POST, Dec. 4, 2007 (discussing a scandal at an NYPD crime lab); Jim
Yardley, Inquiry Focuses on Scientist Employed by Prosecutors, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2001 (discussing
the Joyce Gilchrist Oklahoma scandal); Court Invalidates a Decade of Blood Test Results in Criminal
Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 1993 (discussing the Fred Zain West Virginia scandal). The
problems that have come to light have occurred in a variety of forensic areas, including serology,
bloodstain pattern analysis, DNA, fingerprint identification and others. While our primary focus
in this Article is on pattern evidence, these scandals serve as a reminder that the issues we
describe warrant thoughtful attention throughout forensic science, not just in the pattern
identification arena.
6.
See Robert B. Stacey, Report on the Erroneous Fingerprint Individualization in the Madrid
Train Bombing Case, 54 J FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 706 (2004); OVERSIGHT AND REVIEW DIV.,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, A REVIEW OF THE FBI’S HANDLING OF THE BRANDON MAYFIELD CASE
(2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/s0601/PDF_list.htm.
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study found that the trials of more than half of those defendants exonerated
by post-conviction DNA testing included forensic evidence offered by the
7
prosecution. A follow-up study examining the underlying transcripts
concluded that the testimony presented by forensic analysts had frequently
8
been overstated or misleading. While currently available information does
not permit quantification beyond the sample of case examined, these
studies do suggest that misleading or erroneous forensic science has
contributed to a substantial number of false convictions. A number of
academics began to examine the research foundation of some long-used
forensic disciplines and found that frequently made claims were supported
by far less rigorous research than might have been expected. And in
February 2009, the prestigious National Academy of Sciences (NAS) issued
a long-awaited report on the forensic sciences that concluded: “With the
exception of DNA analysis, . . . no forensic method has been rigorously
shown to have the capacity to consistently, and with a high degree of
certainty, demonstrate a connection between evidence and a specific
9
individual or source.”
The NAS Report suggested a number of major improvements for
forensic science. Most significantly, it called for the creation of an entirely
new, independent federal agency to oversee and regulate the practices of
forensic science, and to ensure the development of rigorous research to
7.
Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 82 (2008).
8.
See Brandon L. Garrett & Peter J. Neufeld, Invalid Forensic Science Testimony and
Wrongful Convictions, 95 VA. L. REV. 1 (2009). There are three important caveats to be made
regarding this article’s conclusions. First, the single most problematic form of evidence in the
Garrett & Neufeld study was microscopic hair analysis, which is now typically used as an adjunct
to mitochondrial DNA assessment of hair. Some have therefore argued that this makes the
study’s conclusions largely moot. See, e.g., JOHN COLLINS & JAY JARVIS, CRIME LAB REPORT,
THE WRONGFUL CONVICTION OF FORENSIC SCIENCE (2008), available at
http://www.crimelabreport.com/library/pdf/wrongful_conviction.pdf. However, there is no reason
to believe that the culture that produced these frequent overstatements and failures to adhere
strictly to conclusions warranted by the evidence was limited to microscopic hair analysis.
Second, it is important to recognize that some of the expert testimony was not erroneous or
overstated, even if it turned out to invite an incorrect inference about the identity of the
perpetrator. See, e.g., COMM. ON IDENTIFYING THE NEEDS OF THE FORENSIC SCIS. CMTY., NAT’L
RESEARCH COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH
FORWARD 120 (2009) [hereinafter NAS REPORT] (pointing out that evidence such as physical
inspection of hair or paint that merely identifies a trace as falling into a large class of potential
sources is accurate even if it turns out that the defendant is not the source). Third, of course, we
have virtually no direct information in these cases about how the jury perceived the forensic
science evidence. It would therefore be dangerous to infer from the mere fact of conviction that
the jury found the forensic science evidence either persuasive or critical in any given case;
however, it would be equally questionable to presume that it did not. The prosecution proffered
it, after all, to aid in conviction.
9.
NAS REPORT, supra note 8, at 7.
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determine the capabilities and the limits of forensic science.
This
combination of events—legal challenges, laboratory scandals, widely
publicized errors, skeptical scholarship, and a highly critical national
report—has focused sometimes unwelcome but badly needed attention on
the forensic sciences. These developments offer the opportunity for
reflection and improvement.
Now, roughly two years after the publication of this major report,
where do the pattern and impression disciplines and the forensic sciences
11
more generally stand? What are the ongoing problems in these fields?
What ought to be the intellectually significant and yet practically realizable
goals for improving forensic science evidence over the next decade or two?
The purpose of this Article is to describe what we think forensic science
most needs in order to best serve justice, the legal system, the public, and its
own practitioners. Our central argument is that the pattern identification
disciplines, and forensic science more generally, do not currently possess—
and absolutely must develop—an adequate research culture. In what
follows, we will outline the essential elements of a research culture; provide
examples to support our claim that within these disciplines such a culture is
weak or faltering; and offer some concrete suggestions for how a research
culture might be created.
The authors of this essay are a diverse group. This group includes
those who are quite regularly labeled critics of forensic science, as well as
defenders, including some who toil in the fields of forensic science every
day. It includes forensic analysts from several fields who regularly appear in
court testifying to the reliability of forensic evidence, as well as those who
have appeared in court criticizing such evidence. Some of us are pursuing
empirical research about forensic science; others write more conceptually
10.
Id.
11.
Our primary focus is on pattern and impression evidence. These disciplines include
fingerprint analysis, firearms and toolmark comparison, questioned document examination,
shoeprint examination, microscopic hair comparison, tire tread comparison, blood spatter analysis,
bite mark analysis, and other physical object comparisons. These disciplines have in common
that they attempt to determine whether or not a particular pattern or impression—be it a
shoeprint, a tire tread, a fingerprint, or a bullet—can be associated with a particular source.
(Blood spatter analysis is an exception, as it attempts to use the pattern of blood to infer
something about the physical events that gave rise to them). Although we focus primarily on
pattern evidence, many of our arguments apply to forensic science more broadly. Tracing out with
specificity where they do and do not fully apply across the broader range of forensic sciences—
from DNA analysis to arson investigation to toxicology—is beyond the scope of this Article. We
recognize that different portions of the forensic science landscape vary in the extent to which they
already possess a robust research culture, but we believe that the forensic science enterprise, as a
whole, would benefit from more focused efforts to develop the outlook and practices referred to in
this Article as a research culture.
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about its strengths and limitations; still others among us spend more time
practicing forensic science than writing about it. One of us is a former
director of a major crime laboratory. The academics in this group come
from multiple fields and varying disciplinary backgrounds, including law,
cognitive psychology, chemistry, molecular biology, forensic science, and
the sociology of science. One member of the group was on the NAS
committee and helped write its report.
Given the breadth of backgrounds, disciplines, and points of view, and
given the current controversies surrounding forensic science, it will come as
no surprise that this diverse group of authors does not agree about
everything. We cannot pretend to share a wholly unified vision for the
future of forensic science. But what is striking—and what generated this
Article—is that there is a good deal about which we do agree. The purpose
of this Article is to focus on these substantial areas of agreement. We aim
to lay out our shared understanding of some of the current problems in
forensic science, and our consensus on how to improve the pattern
identification fields, and the rest of the forensic science enterprise, so that
they will rest on an appropriately secure foundation as they continue to
provide valuable evidence into the twenty-first century.
Significantly, despite our diverse backgrounds and points of view, we
agree on many aspects of both the diagnosis of current difficulties and a
direction for a cure. In our collective opinion, the pattern identification
disciplines, as well as other forms of forensic science evidence, must be
placed on a more rigorous scientific foundation. More generally, we believe
that a significant culture shift is required: Forensic science needs to focus
more on science than on law, to shift from a quasi-adversarial perspective to
a research orientation. In short, we call for the development and
instantiation of what we will term a research culture within forensic science.
The emergence of a research culture would affect how evidence is
understood, change analysts’ relationship to empirical data, and alter how
evidence is reported. We do not delude ourselves that change comes easily
or that a culture shift alone will immediately ensure that all forensic
12
But we believe that this transition is both
analyses are well founded.
necessary and, while difficult, genuinely feasible.
12.
To be sure, scientists steeped in the research culture we describe in this Article also
sometimes make claims that outstrip their data or promote methods before the application has
been shown to be fully robust or before all its limitations are clear. See, e.g., DAVID H. KAYE, THE
DOUBLE HELIX AND THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 51–53 (2010) (describing the early claims of the
developer of DNA fingerprinting). Nevertheless, in a competitive research culture, any premature
enthusiasm or dubious assertions are likely to be met with criticism from others in the community,

58:3

Mnookin et al

Mnookin Final Proof 1

(1/12/2011 3:41:00 PM)

8

DRAFT: Do not cite

In what follows, we begin with a brief overview of the NAS Report, a
watershed publication for the assessment of the current state of the forensic
sciences. We use this report as a springboard to describe our consensus
about what the forensic sciences need most in order to attain a solid footing
over the next decades: to wit, the creation of a robust research culture, in
which empirical evidence and careful scrutiny regarding the evidentiary
warrant for whatever claims are made become part of the ordinary way of
thinking about forensic practices. In Part II, we describe what we see as the
critical components of a research culture, including a focus on empirical
evidence, transparency, and a consistently critical and reflective perspective
on claims of knowledge. In Part III, we provide a number of examples and
illustrations to show why we do not believe that the research culture within
forensic sciences, and within pattern and impression evidence in particular,
is presently either well developed or robust. In the final Part, we offer a
variety of suggestions, some of them familiar and some of them more
innovative, for creating and fostering a research culture for forensic science.

I.

THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES REPORT

In February 2009, The National Academy of Sciences issued its major
13
report on forensic science. Congress commissioned the report late in 2005
at the behest of the forensic science community itself. The Academy
appointed a panel of judges, scholars, and forensic and legal practitioners to
write the report. This committee heard more than sixteen days of
testimony—more than eighty witnesses in eight meetings over a two-year
period—from a variety of leading forensic scientists and academic
14
researchers.
In addition to the major recommendation to create a National
Institute of Forensic Science (NIFS), the committee put forward two other
leading in the long run to a much more secure foundation for the applications of the theory or
procedure. See id. at 53–54, 117, 119–20, 123–26, 138 (describing how the scientists who
promoted or defended DNA identification responded to various published criticisms); see also
Jennifer L. Mnookin, People v. Castro: Challenging the Forensic Use of DNA Evidence, in EVIDENCE
STORIES 207 (Richard Lempert ed., 2006). See generally D. Michael Risinger, The Irrelevance, and
Central Relevance, of the Boundary Between Science and Non-Science in the Evaluation of Expert
Witness Reliability, 52 VILL. L. REV. 679, 700–12 (2007).
13.
NAS REPORT, supra note 8.
14.
Harry T. Edwards, Co-Chair, Committee On Identifying the Needs of the Forensic
Science Community, The National Academy of Sciences Report on Forensic Sciences: What It
Means for the Bench and Bar (May 6, 2010). For a close look at the committee and who was on
it, see D. Michael Risinger, The NAS/NRC Report on Forensic Science: A Path Forward Fraught with
Pitfalls, 2010 UTAH L. REV. (forthcoming).
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important structural recommendations: the removal of public forensic
science laboratories from administrative control of law enforcement
15
agencies or prosecutor’s offices; and the gradual abolition of state and local
16
coroner’s offices in favor of a medical examiner system.
Given the
committee’s key finding that an inadequate research basis existed for claims
often made in forensic science, most of the recommendations were
concerned with improving the science in forensic science. Specific
recommendations included calls for:
(1) Foundational research that would assess the validity and
reliability of methods used in the analysis of evidence,
17
especially pattern evidence.
(2) Further research into the issues of cognitive bias and its
effects on forensic decisionmaking.
The committee
recognized the significant need to investigate when
contextual or confirmational bias might affect examiner’s
processes or their conclusions, and the need both to study its
18
extent and to develop countermeasures.
(3) Standardization of laboratory reports and a standard
definition of terms, especially those expressing the
association between an item of evidence and a possible
19
source.
(4) Mandatory accreditation of all forensic science laboratories
that process evidence for court and mandatory certification
20
of all forensic scientists who analyze evidence.
(5) A mandatory code of ethics that is tied to certification and
makes possible the removal of serious ethical violators from
21
the practice of forensic science.

The NAS Committee was not charged specifically with examining the
issues surrounding pattern and impression evidence, although the final
report does emphasize these areas. This focus emerged as the committee
heard testimony about the present state of research and the validity and
reliability of forensic science methods. In testimony presented, various
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
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types of pattern evidence were cited as poster children for the lack of
scientific foundation in forensic science and the need for more research to
establish the validity (or lack of it) in forensic science’s analytical
22
Fairly or not, the report reflects this emphasis, and in this
methods.
Article, we too focus primarily on the pattern and impression areas.
Nevertheless, it is important to recognize that the pattern evidence areas
are not alone in generating the concerns expressed in the NAS Report or in
this Article. Every area of forensic science, including DNA typing,
described by the NAS Committee as the “gold standard” of forensic science,
suffers to some degree from the problems the Report ascribed to pattern
evidence. Most of the recommendations in the NAS Report are global in
their reach; they are intended to apply to forensic science as a whole.
Similarly, although we focus on pattern and impression evidence processed
by human analysts using visual examination, many of our arguments apply
beyond these domains. At the same time, we recognize that forensic
science culture is not monolithic or unitary. We hope that our remarks in
the context of pattern and impression evidence will encourage further
discussion and attention to the question of how to create, develop, or
improve the research culture in other areas, including forensic chemistry,
DNA analysis, fire investigation, and medicolegal death investigation.
We all agree that publication of the Report was a watershed moment
for the forensic sciences. The Report continues to generate both attention
and controversy. Already it has prompted, or at least spurred, some degree
23
of change in forensic science practice. It continues to influence practicing
forensic scientists themselves, as well as those who interact with forensic
disciplines, including lawyers and judges, government officials, and
government regulatory and funding entities such as the National Institute
of Justice (NIJ), National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),
24
and the National Science Foundation (NSF).
22.
Chapter five of the NAS Report discusses and offers summary assessments of, for
example, biological evidence, analysis of controlled substances, friction ridge analysis, shoeprints
and tire tracks, toolmark and firearms identification, hair and fiber evidence, questioned
document examination, paint and coating evidence, arson and explosives evidence, bitemark
analysis, and bloodstain pattern analysis. See id. at 127–83. Chapter nine focuses entirely on
medicolegal death analysis. See id. at 241–68.
23.
See, e.g., IAI Resolution 2010–18 (July 16, 2010) (reflecting a “change [in] the official
position of the Association related to Friction Ridge Examinations based on advances in the
science and scientific research”).
24.
The National Science Foundation recently funded a workshop at Northwestern Law
School called “Cognitive Bias and Forensic Science” largely designed to encourage social and
cognitive psychologists to conduct empirical studies to improve our understanding of factors that
affect forensic science judgments and decisions. Similarly, the National Institute of Justice has
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We also agree with much of the content of the Report. Perhaps most
significantly, we agree with the National Academy’s central and important
conclusion that the traditional forensic sciences are, at this point,
inadequately supported by empirical data that would justify the strong
claims analysts frequently make. We believe that numerous assertions made
both in routine practice and in court are neither backed up by sufficient
empirical data or research, nor are the kinds of claims that can be justified
26
or validated simply by reference to longstanding experience. We have in
mind, for example, asserting an error rate of zero for the methodology of
latent fingerprint identification; testifying that forensic practitioners have
an adequate empirical and experiential basis for confidently determining in
run-of-the-mill cases that two prints—or shoe marks or firearms or
exemplars of handwriting—share a common source to the exclusion of all
27
other possible sources; claiming confidence based on experience that
solicited research proposals from social scientists to study, for example, “‘context bias’ and the
need for a greater understanding of the scope of this issue in forensic laboratories.” NAT’L INST.
OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SOLICITATION: SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH IN FORENSIC
SCIENCE 3 (2010).
25.
One author of this Article served on the NAS committee, and several others gave
invited presentations to the committee. Nonetheless, we do not agree with every sentence or
every detail of every argument in this report. Certainly we each have both nits to pick as well as
admiration for its strengths; indeed several of us have already expressed both our criticism and our
praise in print. See, e.g., Simon A. Cole, Who Speaks for Science? A Response to the National
Academy of Sciences Report on Forensic Science, 9 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK 25 (2010); Itiel E.
Dror, How Can Francis Bacon Help Forensic Science? The Four Idols of Human Biases, 50
JURIMETRICS J. 93 (2009); David H. Kaye, The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: The NRC Report on
Strengthening Forensic Science in America, 50 SCI. & JUST. 8 (2010); Jonathan J. Koehler, Forensic
Science Reform in the 21st Century: A Major Conference, a Blockbuster Report and Reasons to Be
Pessimistic, 9 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK 1 (2010); Mnookin, supra note 4; D. Michael Risinger,
The NAS/NRC Report on Forensic Science: A Glass Nine-Tenths Full (This Is About the Other
Tenth), 50 JURIMETRICS J. 21 (2009); Risinger, supra note 14. For a collection of responses from
the forensic science community, see id. at ___.
26.
See, e.g., Mark A. Acree, What Is Science? The Dilemma of Fingerprint Science Revisited,
14 PRINT 4 (1998); Michelle Reznicek et al., ACE-V and the Scientific Method, 60 J. FORENSIC
IDENTIFICATION 87 (2010); Michele Triplett & Lauren Cooney, The Etiology of ACE-V and Its
Proper Use: An Exploration of the Relationship Between ACE-V and the Scientific Method of Hypothesis
Testing, 56 J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 345 (2006); Norah Rudin & Keith Inman, The
Fourth
Quarter
2010,
at
10,
available at
Experience
Fallacy,
CACNEWS,
http://cacnews.org/news/4thq10.pdf.
27.
There may be rare instances when the strong claim of individualization could be
warranted because both sides agree that the universe of potential suspects is small—such as, for
example, in a situation where it is uncontested that a murder was committed by one of a small
group of people in a locked house. But this inference is warranted in these circumstances because
of the reduced size of the possible suspect population, not because of the prints’ power to
individualize to the exclusion of all others in the universe. See KAYE, BERNSTEIN & MNOOKIN,
supra note 3, § 15.2; David H. Kaye, Probability, Individualization, and Uniqueness in Forensic
Evidence: Listening to the Academics, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 1163, 1174–75 (2010) (arguing that
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analysts have taken adequate steps to counter the effects of bias and
context; or averring that the techniques used by forensic pattern disciplines
28
follow “the scientific method.”
We do recognize that experience, training, and longstanding
investigatory and legal use can be sources of legitimate knowledge for
pattern identification analysts. We also recognize that experience and
training can give examiners, from a subjective point of view, sincere and
deeply held confidence about their ability to do what they claim to do. But
we do not believe that experience and training alone can validate
universalist claims, such as the claim that latent fingerprint identification
experts can individualize the source of a print to the exclusion of all other
29
possibilities, or the claim that document examiners’ experience enables
them to assess the entire range of differences between two handwriting
30
exemplars that can still be consistent with authorship by the same hand.
testing most, but not all, of a closed set of suspects can justify the conclusion that the trace
evidence originated from a single individual).
28.
To some extent, these specific rhetorical claims are being modified in the aftermath of,
and in response to, the Report. Indeed, the day after the Report was issued, the president of the
International Association of Identification (IAI) wrote the membership: “It is suggested that
members not assert 100% infallibility (zero error rate) when addressing the reliability of
fingerprint comparisons.” Memorandum From Robert Garrett, President, Int’l Ass’n for
Identification, to the Membership of Int’l Ass’n for Identification (Feb. 19, 2009), available at
http://www.theiai.org/current_affairs/nas_memo_20090219.pdf. In July, 2010, the IAI also
opened the door to probabilistic testimony regarding the likelihood of a fingerprint match, and
rescinded a 1979 resolution that limited such testimony to only three possible conclusions:
individualization, exclusion, and unknown. For the recent resolution, see IAI Resolution 2010–
18, supra note 23. In the summer of 2010, the chairman of the Scientific Working Group on
Friction Ridge Analysis, Study and Technology (SWGFAST), a standard-setting organization for
friction ridge analysis, issued a “clarification” asserting that the phrase “to the exclusion of all
others” is likely to be removed from its Friction Ridge Examination Methodology materials.
Letter From Leonard G. Butt, Chairman, Scientific Working Group on Friction Ridge Analysis,
Study, and Tech., to Whom It May Concern (June 29, 2010), available at
http://www.swgfast.org/Comments-Positions/SWGFAST_NAS_Position_Clarification.doc.
While we believe that all of these terminological shifts are positive developments, they do not
negate or eliminate our more general arguments about the continued lack of a research culture in
much of the pattern identification sciences, nor do they solve the problem of how to responsibly
characterize the probative value of the results of an analysis. On this latter difficulty, see generally
KAYE, BERNSTEIN & MNOOKIN, supra note 3, § 15; Mnookin, supra note 4.
29.
For discussion of the dubious underpinnings of assertions of “global individualization,”
see KAYE, BERNSTEIN & MNOOKIN, supra note 3.
30.
See, e.g., What Is Forensic Document Examination?: Handwriting Examination, SE. ASS’N
OF FORENSIC DOCUMENT EXAMINERS, http://www.safde.org/whatwedo.htm (last visited Dec. 26,
2010):
Handwriting identification is based on the principle that, while handwriting within
a language tends to be alike to the degree that we can meaningfully read it, there are
individual features that distinguish one person’s writing from that of another. Just as no
two people are exactly alike, the handwritings of no two people are exactly alike in their
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More generally, we believe that not enough is yet known about a
significant range of important questions. Consider, for example, the
following: Precisely what are the capabilities and limitations of any
particular pattern discipline? How often do pattern identification analysts
make mistakes? When these errors occur, what causes them? How should
31
error be defined, and what circumstances tend to increase the risk of error?
How prevalent is the effect of cognitive bias on the activity of forensic
examiners? When might access to contextual information affect forensic
examiners’ cognitive processes, or even their final determinations? How
frequently might a portion of two fingerprints—or striation marks on
bullets, or toolmarks, or handwriting specimens—share any given degree of
similarity even if they derive from different sources? How does the use of
large databases or new imaging technologies help these disciplines, and
what dangers may new technologies pose? Just how much visual
information is sufficient to undertake an accurate analysis of a handwriting
specimen, a latent fingerprint, or a firearm? To what extent does training
improve examiner accuracy? What kind of training is most effective?
The honest response to all of these questions is that we do not yet
know. Suggestive research is emerging in some of these areas, including
32
contributions from several co-authors of this Article. But we all agree that
combination of characteristics. There are, of course, natural variations within the
handwriting of each individual. These variations must be closely and carefully studied by
the examiner, so that he can distinguish between what is a “variation” and what is a
“difference.”
The examiner must also be cognizant of the differences between “class
characteristics” and “individual characteristics.” Class characteristics are those which are
common to a group such as a particular writing system, family grouping, foreign language
system, or professional group. Individual characteristics are those which are personal or
peculiar letters or letter combinations, which, taken together, would not occur in the
writing of another person.
31.
See generally id. § 7.3.2(c); D. Michael Risinger, Whose Fault?: Daubert, the NAS Report
and the Notion of Error in Forensic Science, FORDHAM URB. L.J. (forthcoming 2011).
32.
See, e.g., Jan Beck, Sources of Error in Forensic Handwriting Evaluation, 40 J. FORENSIC
SCI. 78 (1995); Silvia Bozza et al., Probabilistic Evaluation of Handwriting Evidence: Likelihood Ratio
for Authorship, 57 J. ROYAL STAT. SOC’Y SERIES C: APPLIED STAT. 329 (2008); Stephen G.
Bunch, Consecutive Matching Striation Criteria: A General Critique, 45 J. FORENSIC SCI. 955 (2000);
Christopher Champed, Edmond Locard — Numerical Standards & “Probable” Identifications, 45 J.
FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 136 (1995); Christophe Champod et al, Establishing the Most
Appropriate Databases for Addressing Source Level Propositions, 44 SCI. & JUST. 153 (2004); Itiel E.
Dror et al., Contextual Information Renders Experts Vulnerable to Making Erroneous Identifications,
156 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L 74 (2006); Itiel E. Dror & Robert Rosenthal, Meta-analytically
Quantifying the Reliability and Biasability of Forensic Experts, 53 J. FORENSIC SCI. 900 (2008); Itiel E.
Dror & David Charlton, Why Experts Make Errors, 56 J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 600 (2006);
Adrian G. Dyer et al., An Insight Into Forensic Document Examiner Expertise for Discriminating
Between Forged and Disguised Signatures, 53 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1154 (2008); Bryan Found & Doug
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as of yet, the research basis that would permit a satisfying scientific answer
to any of the above questions does not exist.
To be sure, we also recognize that the absence of evidence is not
33
necessarily evidence of absence. Until recently, virtually no institution—
not the courts, not government funding agencies, very few research
organizations or forensic science laboratories—was investing a great deal of
34
time, energy, or resources into answering these questions. We therefore
lack any major body of published scientific research directed at empirically
Rogers, The Probative Character of Forensic Handwriting Examiners’ Identification and Elimination
Opinions on Questioned Signatures, 178 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L 54 (2008); Moshe Kam et al.,
Signature Authentication by Forensic Document Examiners, 46 J. FORENSIC SCI. 884 (2001); Moshe
Kam & Erwei Lin, Writer Identification Using Hand-Printed and Non-Hand-Printed Questioned
Documents, 48 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1391 (2003); Glenn Langenburg, A Performance Study of the ACEV Process: A Pilot Study to Measure the Accuracy, Precision, Reproducibility, Repeatability, and
Biasability of Conclusion Resulting From the ACE-V Process, 59 J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 219
(2009); Glenn Langenburg et al., Testing for Potential Contextual Bias Effects During the Verification
Stage of the ACE-V Methodology When Conducting Fingerprint Comparisons, 54 J. FORENSIC SCI. 571
(2009); D. Meuwly, Forensic Individualisation From Biometric Data, 46 SCI. & JUST. 205 (2006);
Cedric Neumann et al., Computation of Likelihood Ratios in Fingerprint Identification for
Configurations of Any Number of Minutiæ, 52 J. FORENSIC SCI. 54 (2007); Beatrice Schiffer &
Christophe Champod, The Potential (Negative) Influence of Observational Biases at the Analysis Stage
of Fingermark Individualisation, 167 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L 116 (2007); Sargur N. Srihari et al.,
Discriminability of Fingerprints of Twins, 58 J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 109 (2008); Sargur N.
Srihari et al., Individuality of Handwriting, 47 J. FORENSIC SCI. 856 (2002); Kasey Wertheim et al.,
A Report of Latent Print Examiner Accuracy During Comparison Training Exercises, 56 J. FORENSIC
IDENTIFICATION 55 (2006); Steve Gutowski, Error Rates in Fingerprint Examination: The View in
2006, FORENSIC BULL.,(Nat’l Inst. of Forensic Sci., Austl) Autumn 2006, at 18. This list is not
exhaustive and should not be considered an endorsement of particular studies. While some of the
research listed above is first rate, other studies may have significant flaws. But these works do at
least constitute efforts to examine empirically relevant questions that have often been assumed
rather than investigated.
33.
Carl Sagan appears to have originated the felicitous phrasing “absence of evidence is
not evidence of absence.” CARL SAGAN, THE DEMON-HAUNTED WORLD: SCIENCE AS A
CANDLE IN THE DARK 213 (1996). The difficulty with this aphorism is that the absence of
evidence supporting a theory following a search for it can be evidence of the falsity of the theory.
Cf. Elliott Sober, Absence of Evidence and Evidence of Absence: Evidential Transitivity in Connection
With Fossils, Fishing, Fine-tuning, and Firing Squads, 143 PHIL. STUD. 63 (2009). However, read in
context, Sagan was criticizing as “impatience with ambiguity” both the notion that whatever has
not been proved false must be true and the opposite, that what has not been proved true must be
false. SAGAN, supra, at 213. Inferring validity from the fact that many kinds of forensic science
have not been proved invalid, and inferring invalidity from the lack of scientific proof of validity
are both dangers to avoid.
34.
There have been, to be sure, individuals engaged in some degree of research. See supra
note 32. At the institutional level, there are also limited exceptions to these generalizations: the
present research efforts emerging from the University of Lausanne and the period at the
University of California-Berkeley in which several students under the tutelage of chemist and
forensic scientist Paul Kirk pursued fundamental research in forensics are perhaps the most
notable. On the current research program at Lausanne, see, for example, School of Criminal Justice
(ESC), UNIVERSITÉ DE LAUSANNE, http://www.unil.ch/central/page2904_en.html (last visited
Oct. 29, 2010).
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validating the conceptual claims and underpinnings of the pattern
35
As a body of research continues to
identification forensic disciplines.
emerge, and we learn more about the frequency and types of errors that do
occur, we may well find that many current practices turn out to have
tolerably low error rates. As we develop and validate methods for
probabilistic assessments of fingerprints, documents, or firearms, we may
learn that in many circumstances the chances of a coincidental match are
extremely remote, and we will certainly learn more about how common or
remote they truly are. It could turn out that analysts’ experience-based
intuitive judgments about the correspondence sufficient to declare a match,
even if not presently quantified or formally specified, are generally quite
accurate. It may be that the biasing effects of access to contextual
information extraneous to the forensic analysis rarely impact an examiner’s
conclusion or ultimate judgment when the information contained within
the pattern is otherwise sufficiently clear.
All of this is possible. But none of it is yet adequately established.
While our collective hunches about what the expanding pool of research
will reveal vary, we all expect that additional, high-quality research will
confirm that many forensic science techniques, including many kinds of
pattern and impression evidence, do have a considerable degree of
discriminatory power; and that there exists significant variation in
discriminatory power across fields and within any given field, depending
36
Furthermore, we all agree that we
upon particularized circumstances.
35. NAS REPORT, supra note 8, at 107–08 (“Much forensic evidence—including, for
example, bite marks and firearm and toolmark identifications—is introduced in criminal trials
without any meaningful scientific validation, determination of error rates, or reliability testing to
explain the limits of the discipline”). There are, to be sure, a handful of researchers beginning to
change this, but a substantial body of work points out the absence of an adequate scientific
foundation or empirical basis for the forensic sciences. See, e.g., SIMON A. COLE, SUSPECT
IDENTITIES: A HISTORY OF FINGERPRINTING AND CRIMINAL IDENTIFICATION (2001); Simon A.
Cole, Is Fingerprint Identification Valid? Rhetorics of Reliability in Fingerprint Proponents’ Discourse, 28
LAW & POL’Y 109 (2006); David L. Faigman, Anecdotal Forensics, Phrenology, and Other Abject
Lessons From the History of Science, 59 HASTINGS L. J. 979 (2008); Jennifer L. Mnookin,
Fingerprint Evidence in an Age of DNA Profiling, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 13 (2001) [hereinafter
Mnookin, Fingerprint Evidence]; Jennifer L. Mnookin, The Validity of Latent Fingerprint
Identification: Confessions of a Fingerprinting Moderate, 7 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK 127 (2008)
[hereinafter Mnookin, Confessions]; D. Michael Risinger et al., Exorcism of Ignorance as a Proxy for
Rational Knowledge: The Lessons of Handwriting Identification “Expertise,” 137 U. PA. L. REV. 731
(1989); Michael J. Saks, The Legal and Scientific Evaluation of Forensic Science (Especially Fingerprint
Expert Testimony), 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 1167, 1186–87 (2003); David A. Stoney, Measurement
of Fingerprint Individuality, in ADVANCES IN FINGERPRINT TECHNOLOGY 327, 329 (Henry C. Lee
& R.E. Gaensslen eds., 2d ed. 2001).
36.
We all would predict, for example, that latent fingerprint identification will turn out to
have a good deal more discriminatory power across a broader range of circumstances than forensic
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presently lack sufficient knowledge regarding the precise extent of this
power or its limits.
Calling, therefore, for more research into these important questions, is
both obvious and necessary. Here, again, we largely agree with the NAS
Report’s conclusion:
In most areas of forensic science, no well-defined system exists
for determining error rates, and proficiency testing shows that some
examiners perform poorly . . . .
In most forensic science disciplines, no studies have been
conducted of large populations to establish the uniqueness of marks
or features. Yet, despite the lack of a statistical foundation,
examiners make probabilistic claims based on their experience. A
statistical framework that allows quantification of these claims is
greatly needed. These disciplines also critically need to standardize
and clarify the terminology used in reporting and testifying about the
results and in providing more information.
Little rigorous research has been done to validate the basic
premises and techniques in a number of forensic science disciplines.
The committee sees no evident reason why conducting such research
37
is not feasible . . . .

To be sure, calling for more research is hardly a radical or controversial
suggestion. Indeed, in the aftermath of the NAS Report, calls for more
research have been widespread. Despite the Report’s contentious reception,
and notwithstanding the significant disagreements within forensic science,
we cannot actually point to anyone who has argued that more research, in
the abstract, is a bad idea. We have certainly heard it said that more
38
research is not needed for basic validation. We have heard it said that the
odontology (bitemark analysis). On bitemarks, see Mary A. Bush et al., Statistical Evidence for the
Similarity of the Human Dentition, 56 J. FORENSIC SCI. (forthcoming 2011); D. Michael Risinger,
Navigating Expert Reliability: Are Criminal Standards of Certainty Being Left on the Dock?, 64 ALB. L.
REV. 99 (2000); Michael J. Saks, Merlin & Solomon: Lessons From the Law’s Formative Encounters
With Forensic Identification Science, 49 HASTINGS L. J. 1069 (1998). On the need to focus on the
particularized task at hand rather than making global, field-wide admissibility judgments, see
generally, D. Michael Risinger, Defining the “Task at Hand”: Non-Science Forensic Science After
Kumho Tire v. Carmichael, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 767 (2000).
37.
NAS REPORT, supra 8, at 188–89.
38.
See The AFTE Comm. for the Advancement of the Sci. of Firearm and Tool Mark
Identification, The Response of the Association of Firearm and Tool Mark Examiners to the February
2009 National Academy of Science Report “Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A Path
Forward”, 41 AFTE J. 204, 205 (2009) (“There is an extensive body of research, extending back
over one hundred years, which establishes the accuracy, reliability, and validity of conclusions
rendered in the field of firearm and toolmark identification.”); Jeffrey G. Barnes, History, in THE
FINGERPRINT
SOURCEBOOK
1–17
(2010),
available
at
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costs of research need to be balanced against other needs. And we have
heard it said that forensic science laboratories are too busy to undertake, or
even participate, in research. While not everyone views more research as
imperative, we are not aware of anyone who, in print, or even in the
hallways of conferences or crime labs, opposes the very idea of research in
the abstract.
But “more research,” imprecisely defined, is not enough. What
forensic science needs is the creation and institutionalization of a research
culture.

II.

WHAT IS A RESEARCH CULTURE?

What do we mean by a research culture? Put simply, we mean a
culture in which the question of the relationship between research-based
knowledge and laboratory practices is both foregrounded and central. We
mean a culture in which the following questions are primary: What do we
know? How do we know that? How sure are we about that? We mean a
culture in which these questions are answered by reference to data, to
published studies, and to publically accessible materials, rather than
primarily by reference to experience or craft knowledge, or simply assumed
to be true because they have long been assumed to be true.
Before elaborating on the meaning of a research culture—and before
presenting examples of the absence of a deep and robust research culture
within forensic science together with suggestions for how to build it—it is
critical to make one point: While we firmly believe that a research culture
needs to become both more central and more entrenched within forensic
science more generally, and within the pattern and impression disciplines
specifically, this does not—and should not—mean that all forensic
practitioners should henceforth be doing research. To the contrary. Even
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/225321.pdf (“Study, research, and experimentation have led to
and supported fingerprints as a means of individualization and a forensic tool of incalculable value.
The research and practical knowledge accumulated over the course of many centuries well support
the science.”); Memorandum From Robert J. Garrett, President, Int’l Ass’n for Identification
(IAI),
to
Members,
IAI
(Feb.
19,
2009),
http://www.theiai.org/current_affairs/nas_memo_20090219.pdf (“There is no research to suggest
that properly trained and professionally guided examiners cannot reliably identify whole or partial
fingerprint impressions to the person from whom they originated.”); SWGGUN Systemic
Requirements/Recommendations for the Forensic Firearm and Toolmark Laboratory, SCIENTIFIC
WORKING
GROUP
FOR
FIREARMS
&
TOOLMARKS,
http://www.swggun.org/guidelinedocs/SWGGUN%20Systemic%20Requirements.pdf
(last
modified Apr. 23, 2010) (“The reliability of the science has been demonstrated and supported
through proficiency tests and validity studies over many decades.”).
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with a research culture in place, most forensic practitioners will continue
simply to practice forensic science. Some forensic practitioners might be
“test subjects” for researchers—the objects of research study to help achieve
a better understanding of the strengths and limitations of their methods and
techniques. They might sometimes partner with researchers to develop
projects, or to evaluate the practical feasibility of a given research design;
on other occasions, they might assess what research needs they deem
especially significant. But even these practitioners need not, and indeed
39
often should not, be the primary producers of the research themselves.
Medicine provides an instructive analogy. Modern medicine is a
product of both craft knowledge and structured research. Whether
medicine incorporates more of a research culture than forensic science is
perhaps debatable, but certainly evidence-based medicine coexists with a
more experience-based, clinical practice orientation still widely influential
40
among doctors. The point for our purposes, however, is that many more
physicians make use of research than produce it. Some physicians certainly
41
do pursue research alongside clinical practice, but large numbers of
physicians make regular use of empirical research in selecting their
diagnoses and treatment regimes without participating in its production.
Their training may enable them to be intelligent consumers of medical
research, but this does not mean they have the skills or the motivation to
conduct it on their own.
Similarly, our hope for a more robust research culture in forensic
science would not turn every forensic scientist into a scientific researcher.
Some practicing forensic scientists would no doubt participate in
39.
On the ways that forensic scientists may feel “role ambiguity” that makes them
uncomfortable with the idea of being research subjects, see Simon A. Cole, Comment on ‘Scientific
Validation of Fingerprint Evidence Under Daubert’, 7 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK 119, 122 (2008).
40.
See Simon A. Cole, Toward Evidence-Based Evidence: Supporting Forensic Knowledge
Claims in the Post-Daubert Era, 43 TULSA L. REV. 263 (2007). On evidence-based medicine, see,
for example, DAVID L. SACKETT ET AL., EVIDENCE-BASED MEDICINE: HOW TO PRACTICE &
TEACH EBM (1997); WILLIAM A. SILVERMAN, WHERE’S THE EVIDENCE? DEBATES IN MODERN
MEDICINE (1998); STEFAN TIMMERMANS & MARC BERG, THE GOLD STANDARD: THE
CHALLENGE OF EVIDENCE-BASED MEDICINE AND STANDARDIZATION IN HEALTH CARE (2003);
Evidence-Based Medicine Working Group, Evidence-Based Medicine—A New Approach to Teaching
the Practice of Medicine, 268 JAMA 2420 (1992); David L. Sackett et al., Evidence-Based Medicine:
What It Is and What It Isn’t, 312 BRIT. MED. J. 71 (1996); Stefan Timmermans & Aaron Mauck,
The Promise and Pitfalls of Evidence Based Medicine, 24 HEALTH AFF. 18 (2005). For a classic
reflection on the sometimes strained relationship between science, research, and the clinical
practice of medicine, see LEWIS THOMAS, THE YOUNGEST SCIENCE: NOTES OF A MEDICINEWATCHER (1983).
41.
Many biomedical researchers have both PhDs and MDs, but there are also many
research physicians with MDs alone.
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conducting research and, as we shall argue below, there ought to be greater
incentives in place to create a larger pool of “two-hat” forensic
practitioners—individuals who are well trained in a forensic discipline and
who have also received substantial formal training in research
methodologies. More generally, rank-and-file forensic practitioners without
special research-oriented training should be taught through both training
and laboratory practice to have respect for research findings. Through
appropriate hiring and training, forensic practitioners can understand the
value of a research culture and apply research findings in practice. But just
as a novice ought not to walk into a forensic science laboratory and begin
analyzing casework, neither should forensic practitioners—even those with
a bachelor’s degree in a scientific discipline and a master’s degree in forensic
science—be expected, or even necessarily encouraged, to develop or
execute a research program on their own. Many practitioners can certainly
assist with research—not only by being test subjects, but also by helping to
generate research agendas regarding the questions that would help them do
their job more effectively, and by partnering with statisticians,
psychologists, computer scientists, physical scientists, and research-oriented
forensic scientists. But to reiterate: A research culture in forensic science
would not turn most practicing forensic scientists into researchers.
What, then, is a research culture? We cannot succeed in providing a
robust and complete definition of a research culture, nor shall we attempt to
do so. But we can usefully describe core constellations of values that are
necessary pieces of a well-functioning research culture in any discipline.
We believe these core values are empiricism, transparency, and an ongoing
critical perspective; we elaborate on each below.
A.

Empiricism

A research culture should have a deep and fundamental respect for the
ideal of empirical support. Claims, both about a field and about particulars,
should be expected as a matter of course to be data-driven. Moreover,
thoughtful attention should focus on the degree to which the body of
available data supports any given claim, and on the relationship between
research results, the claim made, and the degree of confidence expressed.
Hunches—or claims based on anecdote or personal experience—ought not
have the same status as knowledge justified by a substantial body of
rigorously produced data. Research that is deeply methodologically flawed
should be given no credence. Moreover, research that is methodologically
sound should not be touted as offering support for propositions that extend
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beyond the reach of the research design. In short, the extent of sound
empirical support for claims should guide practices in the laboratory,
conclusions in reports, and testimony in the courtroom.
B.

Transparency

A research culture maximizes transparency, both in the production of
knowledge and in internal practices and procedures. Researchers should be
encouraged to make data sets available to other researchers, both to share
the particular basis for their own claims and to encourage further research.
To the extent feasible, laboratories should assist in the production of data
sets that can help address key research inquiries, and laboratory personnel
should be willing to participate in research projects both as collaborators
and as test subjects. To be sure, laboratories may need to delimit access for
practical or legal reasons, and laboratory personnel may need to participate
as research subjects only to the degree it does not interfere with ongoing
operations. But access to data and to examiners as test subjects ought not
to depend on being a practicing forensic scientist (as opposed to a
researcher from another discipline), nor should it require giving a laboratory
veto power or control over publication or dissemination of the results.
More generally, information about ordinary laboratory practices,
procedures, and protocols should be publically available.
In addition, errors should be recognized as an inevitable part of any
human enterprise. Errors should be acknowledged rather than buried under
the carpet. Both the individual and the community should take the
opportunity to learn from them. We do recognize that forensic laboratories
and forensic examiners work within an adversarial legal system. Certainly
the us-versus-them mentality that adversarialism generates can discourage
disclosure beyond what is legally mandated. The dynamics of crossexamination, in which ordinary human limitations and innocent
inconsistencies may be leveraged by opposing counsel into challenges to
credibility, can exacerbate this tendency. These forces may combine to
create significant pressures opposing transparency. While we do understand
this tension—and in the final Part of this Article, we offer some suggestions
42
for managing it —we reiterate that transparency is a critical value of a
functioning research culture.

42.
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Ongoing Critical Perspective

Claims of knowledge should be taken as provisional and subject to
revision in the face of new information. Dogma should be resisted.
Research is not one thing, or one study, or once done, never reexamined.
Research is an ongoing, incremental process. Research problems should be
approached with an open mind. While it is certainly appropriate to have a
hypothesis, or preliminary expectation, about what any given research study
will show, investigators should follow the data whether or not it supports
their original hypothesis, and whether or not it legitimates current
practices. Research projects should be designed according to the norms of
relevant academic fields. They should not be designed defensively, to
43
produce, or to increase the chances of producing, a particular outcome.
Publication and peer review should occur as a matter of course, and a
commitment to publication should not depend on the results. At the same
time, we must recognize that the questions that scientific research attempts
to answer and the questions that must be answered in a courtroom during a
trial are very different. Science is a moving target; answers are always
provisional and can be updated as research produces new information or
challenges accepted findings. But in a trial, the judge or jury must make
pragmatic use of the best available answers to scientific questions at that
given moment in time. As a result, the legal system may quite legitimately
accept evidence, even scientific evidence, that is good enough rather than
44
perfect. Waiting for the next study, or postponing a decision, is typically
not an option. But these determinations, while decisive in a particular case,
should remain epistemically provisional, subject to critical inquiry and
revision in a future case if the research warrants it.

43.
For an example of a recent research study that was criticized along these lines, see Lisa
J. Hall & Emma Player, Will the Introduction of an Emotional Context Affect Fingerprint Analysis and
Decision-Making? 181 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L 36 (2008). For the criticisms, see Itiel E. Dror, On
Proper Research and Understanding of the Interplay Between Bias and Decision Outcomes, 191
FORENSIC SCI. INT’L e17 (2009); Michael J. Saks, Concerning L.J. Hall, E. Player, “Will the
Introduction of an Emotional Context Affect Fingerprint Analysis and Decision-Making?”, 191
FORENSIC SCI. INT’L e19 (2009). For the study authors’ response to these criticisms, see Lisa J.
Hall & Emma Player, The Value of Practitioner Research in the Field of Fingerprint Analysis, 191
FORENSIC SCI. INT’L e15 (2009) (responding to Dror’s criticism); Lisa J. Hall & Emma Player, The
Value of Practitioner Research in the Field of Fingerprint Analysis, 191 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L e21
(2009) (responding to Saks’ criticism).
44.
See, e.g., Jennifer L. Mnookin, Of Black Boxes, Instruments, and Experts: Testing the
Validity of Forensic Science, 5 EPISTEME 343 (2008); Dale A. Nance, Reliability and the Admissibility
of Experts, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 191 (2003).

58:3

Mnookin et al

Mnookin Final Proof 1

(1/12/2011 3:41:00 PM)

22

DRAFT: Do not cite
III.

THE PRESENT LACK OF A RESEARCH CULTURE IN
FORENSIC SCIENCE

A growing number of individuals within the pattern identification
disciplines and other forensic fields do fundamentally embrace the values
associated with a research culture. Nonetheless, at present, these values are
not sufficiently widespread within the pattern identification communities.
In this Part, we provide a variety of examples that illustrate the ways in
which a research culture is still weak or absent in these disciplines.
In court, forensic analysts asked about the bases for their claims
frequently refer to experience and training rather than providing any
systematic data. Experience is a legitimate basis for certain kinds of
knowledge, but it is deeply problematic for experience alone to be the basis
45
Moreover, without robust
for sweeping claims like individualization.
feedback mechanisms to detect and provide information about any possible
mistake, experience cannot be a sound warrant for reaching valid
46
If, for example, a document examiner generally has no
conclusions.
45.
Individualization is the assertion that an item can be identified to a unique, specific
source—that a print can be identified to a particular finger, to the exclusion of every other finger
in the universe; or that a handwriting specimen can be identified as belonging to one and only
one particular author out of the entire human population. Because no individual examiner can
ever examine every possible specimen in the universe, experience alone cannot justify a claim of
individualization, assuming that the potential population of the source is substantial. See, e.g.,
KAYE, BERNSTEIN & MNOOKIN, supra note 3, § 7.3.2(c)(2) (“The least useful measures of errors
are self-congratulatory statements of the practitioners of a technique. In the absence of
systematic, unbiased efforts to root out errors, these estimates amount to little more than reports of
the ‘I don't remember being proved wrong’ variety.”). Whether individualization might ever be a
plausible claim is a far harder question, and one upon which the authors of this Article do not all
agree.
See, e.g., Simon A. Cole, Forensics Without Uniqueness, Conclusions Without
Individualization: The New Epistemology of Forensic Identification, 8 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK 233
(2009); Kaye, supra note 27; Jonathan J. Koehler & Michael J. Saks, Individualization Claims in
Forensic Science: Still Unwarranted, 75 BROOK. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010); Michael J. Saks &
Jonathan J. Koehler, The Individualization Fallacy in Forensic Science Evidence, 61 VAND. L. REV.
199 (2008). But we do agree that experience examining latent prints—even extensive experience
looking at tens of thousands of prints—does not provide an adequate warrant for the assertion of
individualization.
46.
KAYE, BERNSTEIN & MNOOKIN, supra note 3, § 10.3.3 (“Numerous studies have found
that without quick and accurate feedback on correct and incorrect judgments, experience does not
produce expertise and experts routinely overestimate their skills. . . . Casework in forensic
handwriting analysis, latent fingerprint identification, toolmark identification, and other patterns
and impression evidence comparisons rarely involve . . . feedback based on ground truth. The
argument that the judgments of these analysts are valid merely because the practitioners have had
specialized training or ample experience therefore is unimpressive.”); see D. Michael Risinger &
Michael J. Saks, Science and Nonscience in the Courts: Daubert Meets Handwriting Identification
Expertise, 82 IOWA L. REV. 21, 33–34 (1996); Mnookin, supra note 44. Even outside forensic
science, other disciplines vary with regard to the extent of feedback provided by experience.
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independent knowledge of whether or not her conclusions in any given case
are actually correct, how can she learn from her experience? If she never
knows when or if she makes an error, how can she adjust her practices to
increase accuracy? At present, the efforts to create these kinds of feedback
mechanisms are minimal. For example, no laboratory of which we are
aware conducts blind proficiency tests that are given in the stream of
casework in a pattern or impression discipline, or, for that matter, in any
other forensic discipline. Airport security staff, by contrast, are frequently
47
tested covertly in a variety of ways as part of their ordinary workstream.
In one scheme, electronic images of dangerous materials are superimposed
onto actual passengers’ carryons. Other testing, conducted independently
by several agencies, includes no-notice testing of inert bomb parts, weapons,
and other prohibited materials. The TSA explains on its website, “Covert
testing is a critical element of the aviation security system. It measures
effectiveness, identifies vulnerabilities, constantly adapts to challenge
officers while incorporating intelligence in a useable way. Simply put,
without adopting difficult, covert testing, the aviation security system
48
would not be as effective as it is.” Would forensic science not also benefit
from covert testing? Another potentially beneficial technique for assessing
strengths and vulnerabilities is randomly selected case audits to seek out
mistakes or assess the quality of analyses conducted. Some laboratories do
carry out such audits, but neither standard practice nor accreditation
requirements insist upon it. Institutionalizing procedures like these would
serve to check the quality and effectiveness of examiners’ experience and
49
would provide critical information about accuracy.
Physicians, for example, get more feedback than forensic examiners via patient outcomes, but this
is a noisy signal—patients sometimes recover despite care rather than because of it, and even
effective therapies may be ineffective in a given instance either due to bad luck or confounding
issues. Mechanics, for example, have better access to feedback than either forensic scientists or
doctors: Automobiles are not self-healing and their mechanisms are less complex than bodies.
47.
The variety of tests employed are briefly described on the website of the Transportation
Security Administration. Covert Testing: Security Screening, TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION, http://www.tsa.gov/what_we_do/screening/covert_testing.shtm [hereinafter
TSA] (last visited Dec. 26, 2010); see also Dror, supra note 25, at 103.
48.
TSA, supra note 47.
49.
There are, to be sure, some proficiency tests currently in use. But they are not
conducted blindly, nor are they necessarily performed by individual examiners working alone,
without collaboration or assistance from colleagues. Nor, for the most part, does their difficulty
level mirror actual casework. On the problems with the current proficiency tests in use in the
pattern identification field and the potential for using proficiency tests as a method for assessing
accuracy, see Lyn Haber & Ralph Norman Haber, Error Rates for Human Fingerprint Examiners, in
AUTOMATIC FINGERPRINT RECOGNITION SYSTEMS 339 (Nalini Ratha & Ruud Bolle eds., 2004);
Simon A. Cole, More Than Zero: Accounting for Error in Latent Fingerprint Identification, 95 J.
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Many forensic scientists are too willing to infer scientific validity from
50
It is true that some of these forensic
the fact of longstanding use.
51
techniques have been in use for a substantial period. It is also true that
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 985 (2005); Lyn Haber & Ralph Norman Haber, Scientific Validation of
Fingerprint Evidence Under Daubert, 7 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK, 87 (2008); Jonathan J. Koehler,
Fingerprint Error Rates and Proficiency Tests: What They Are and Why They Matter, 59 HASTINGS
L.J. 1077 (2008); Mnookin, Confessions, supra note 35; D. Michael Risinger et al., The
Daubert/Kumho Implications of Observer Effects in Forensic Science: Hidden Problems of Expectation
and Suggestion, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (2002); Jonathan J. Koehler, Proficiency Tests to Estimate
Error Rates in the Forensic Sciences 1–5, (Sept. 19, 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
Northwestern University School of Law).
As for auditing, although the American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors Laboratory
Accreditation Board (ASCLD-LAB) does audit some cases as part of its accreditation process, this
review takes place only once every five years, and cases reviewed are not selected at random. For
a recent instance in which an accredited laboratory had significant problems in its blood analysis
not found through the accreditation process, see Locke & Neff, supra note 5. On ASCLD-Lab
Accreditation Requirements, see ASCLD/LAB-INTERNATIONAL, ASCLD/LAB, INC.,
INTERNATIONAL ACCREDITATION PROGRAM: PROGRAM OVERVIEW (2006).
50.
See United States v. Llera Plaza, Nos. CR. 98-362-10, CR. 98-362-11, CR. 98-362-12
(E.D. Pa. Jan. 7, 2002) (“‘[T]he ACE-V process and the experts’ conclusions have been tested
empirically over a period of 100 years . . . .’” (quoting Gov’t Mot. & Resp. at 112)); United States
v. Havvard, 117 F. Supp. 2d 848, 854 (S.D. Ind. 2000) (“[T]he methods of latent print
identification can be and have been tested. They have been tested for roughly 100 years. They
have been tested in adversarial proceedings with the highest possible stakes—liberty and
sometimes life.”); Transcript of Trial—Day Three at 114–15, United States v. Mitchell, No 96407 (E.D. Pa. July 9, 1999) (“[E]mpirical studies is when you roll up your sleeves, you do
observational analysis. The idea of taking prints, comparing them to other prints to seeing how
often things are similar or dissimilar, is empirical studies. The 100 years of fingerprint
employment has been empirical studies.”) (testimony of Bruce Budowle); David L. Grieve, Simon
Says, 51 J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 85, 95 (2001) (“The testability of fingerprint individuality
has been conducted for nearly a century, perhaps not in one grand empirical study that captivated
the [Daubert] defense, but in the countless smaller studies performed daily in all parts of the
globe.”); Willam F. Leo, Fingerprint Identification: Objective Science or Subjective Opinion?, 17 PRINT
1, 2 (2001) (“A fingerprint examiner’s knowledge and ability can be and is tested, is documented
and can be verified, and is evaluated by the courts and juries every time the examiner takes the
witness stand.”); 60 Minutes: Fingerprints, (CBS television broadcast (Jan. 5, 2003) (“We’re
winning 41 times out of 41 [admissibility] challenges. I think that says something. We have 100
years of experience; let’s make sure that that’s clearly out there. And if it wasn’t reliable, this
certainly would have been discovered many, many years ago.”). But see Bruce Budowle et al., A
Perspective on Errors, Bias, and Interpretation in the Forensic Sciences and Direction for Continuing
Advancement, 54 J. FORENSIC SCI. 798, 799 (2009) (“[F]or many years the forensic science
community has pointed to successful admissibility of its science findings, and the opportunity to
cross examine expert witnesses, as support of a technique’s ‘general acceptance’ and
‘reliability’ . . . . [P]hilosophically we do not advocate successful admissibility as demonstrating
good science.”).
51.
For an example of the early history of fingerprint evidence, see generally COLE, supra
note 35; Jennifer L. Mnookin, Fingerprint Evidence in an Age of DNA Profiling, 67 BROOK. L. REV.
13 (2001). For the history of handwriting identification evidence, see generally Jennifer L.
Mnookin, Scripting Expertise: The History of Handwriting Identification Evidence and the Judicial
Construction of Reliability, 87 VA. L. REV. 1723 (2001) [hereinafter Mnookin, Scripting Expertise];
Risinger et al., supra note 35; D. Michael Risinger, Mark Denbeaux & Michael J. Saks, Exorcism of
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the number of proven errors for some of these techniques is small relative to
52
the frequency of use (though certainly greater than zero). And it is true
that those pieces of information, combined, provide a degree of support for
the claim that latent fingerprint identification, for example, likely has a
substantial degree of accuracy (though this evidence obviously does not
permit quantification of the precise degree of accuracy). Furthermore,
whenever a pattern analyst matches an exemplar to a source, and highly
probative, independent evidence of guilt subsequently emerges (or already
existed but was unknown to the examiner), this corroborating information
provides some indication that the identification technique works,
notwithstanding that case information alone can never provide absolute
assurance about ground truth. Moreover, if these techniques were being
widely used but misidentifying sources at an extremely high rate, one might
expect that in some of these cases, powerful contrary evidence supporting
innocence would emerge and throw the identification technique’s general
53
accuracy into doubt.
While we do therefore grant that this longstanding use establishes
something, it establishes less than its advocates suggest. First, the very fact
that many kinds of pattern evidence are believed to be especially powerful
and persuasive kinds of proof makes inferring validity from its success
dangerous. If a fingerprint error leads to a misidentification, might the
identified individual nonetheless be convicted, or even plead guilty to avoid
a stronger sanction at trial, in the face of evidence that seems virtually
indisputable? Convictions, therefore, do not necessarily establish the
accuracy of the evidence undergirding them. To argue otherwise is a form
of rhetorical bootstrapping. Further support of this point is provided by
numerous failures to uncover errors until well after conviction, and
54
sometimes only through highly fortuitous circumstances. Moreover, the
growth of searchable databases with millions of latent fingerprints may
create significant new dangers because a large database increases the
chances of finding prints from different sources with a high degree of

Ignorance as a Proxy for Rational Knowledge: The Lessons of Handwriting Identification Expertise, 137
U. PA. L. REV. 731 (1989).
52.
Cole, supra note 49.
53.
We make this last point with caution, because strong evidence can likely only be
beaten by equally strong evidence. If, for example, fingerprints are widely seen as dispositive, the
emergence of other evidence strongly suggesting innocence may be dismissed as erroneous in the
face of the fingerprint evidence.
54.
Cole, supra note 49, at 1020–23.
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coincidental similarity.
In addition, defense challenges to fingerprint
evidence, firearms comparison, and other pattern evidence, have been,
56
until recently, very unusual; as a result, these techniques have operated in
57
court as if they were almost self-proving.
The key point is that longstanding use leads some forensic scientists
(and many judges) to treat questions of scientific and systematic validation
58
as moot, or at a minimum, not terribly important. A research culture
would care about, and be willing to invest in, rigorous empirical validation
even of those matters widely thought to be obvious by practicing forensic
scientists.
In addition, a research culture would realize that casework is not
research. To be sure, researchers may introduce research questions into the
stream of what looks to an analyst like ordinary casework. Covert research
of this sort can provide some of the most ecologically valid data about
actual practices. Research could also entail examining casework in a
structured manner. But an analyst engaged in ordinary casework is not
59
Casework may suggest research problems
herself conducting research.
worth exploring. It may lead to hypotheses worth developing. Unusual
case findings may be worth discussing at professional meetings or publishing
as food for thought. Indeed, the International Association of Identification
(IAI) routinely publishes such materials in its journal, and they may
provide useful platforms for discussion and expand the experiential basis
available to practitioners. But case findings ought not to be mistaken for
structured research or empirical data that goes beyond the anecdotal,
55.
Itiel E. Dror & Jennifer L. Mnookin, The Use of Technology in Human Expert Domains:
Challenges and Risks Arising From the Use of Automated Fingerprint Identification Systems in Forensic
Science 9 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK 47, 58 (2010). Databases also play a role in firearms
comparison, though the scale of images in the database is significantly smaller than the largest
automated fingerprint identification systems.
56.
To be sure, in some cases defense counsel may consult with defense experts in
fingerprint identification but elect not to present any defense challenge. While we have no data
on the frequency of such consultations, our point is that the testimony has typically been
presented to the factfinder unchallenged. See generally, COLE, supra note 35; Mnookin, supra note
35.
57.
In the early history of handwriting cases, and at present, in civil disputes, document
examination has tended to have competing experts on both sides. But this has not generally
extended to criminal disputes, especially in modern times. See Mnookin, Scripting Expertise, supra
note 51, at 1730; Risinger et al., supra note 35; Risinger & Saks, supra note 46.
58.
See, e.g., Anil K. Jain et al., On the Similarity of Identical Twin Fingerprints, 35 PATTERN
RECOGNITION 2653 (2002). For criticism of this approach as unfaithful to Daubert’s call for
scientific validation, see KAYE, BERNSTEIN & MNOOKIN, supra note 3, § 7.3.2(a)(4) (arguing that
“adversarial testing is not scientific testing”); see also Mnookin, supra note 4, at 36–37.
59.
Simon A. Cole, ‘Implicit Testing’: Can Casework Validate Forensic Techniques?, 46
JURIMETRICS J. 117 (2006).
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60

Unlike planned research,
whether or not such findings are published.
casework does not permit the development of careful controls, defined
independent variables, or structured and directed focus. Also, and
critically, in casework, ground truth is not known and cannot simply be
inferred by a conviction, a confession, or the consensus judgment of
experts.
However, we do not mean to set up an unrealistically idealized vision
of real research. Legitimate research can vary in its degree of formality and
ecological validity. Often, very good research necessarily simplifies some
aspects of the real world to focus attention on the matter at issue and to
limit potentially confounding variables. Good research can, and usually
does, involve both hard questions of design and imperfect compromises.
But research does, and must, involve explicit study design. And research
reports and publications, comporting with the research culture value of
transparency, must be as explicit as is feasible about the nature of the study
61
design.
Forensic analysts have often failed to recognize the limits of what
conclusions are actually warranted by a given research result. Research is
sometimes used to support conclusions that the data in question simply does
not establish. For example, in fingerprint analysis, evidence that supports
wide variation in human friction ridge detail is frequently offered to support
62
the examiner’s ability to match unknown prints to a source. While the
60.
For examples of the publication of such case studies from fingerprint identification, see,
Michael H. Kershaw, Laterally Reversed, 50 J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 138 (2000); Robert D.
Reneau, Unusual Latent Print Examinations, 53 J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 531 (2003); Dana
Shinozuka, Fingerprints on a Banana Leaf, 50 J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 441 (2000).
61.
Transparency does of course have its limits. Among other reasons, confidentiality
concerns and maintaining the integrity of the project—which may mean, for example, that
examiners do not necessarily know when they are being studied—may require a degree of secrecy.
For discussions of the importance of study design, see, for example, KAYE, BERNSTEIN &
MNOOKIN, supra note 3, § 12.5 (discussing “the importance of the design of studies”); HANS
ZEISEL & DAVID H. KAYE, PROVE IT WITH FIGURES: EMPIRICAL METHODS IN LAW AND
LITIGATION 11 (1997) (discussing compromises such as “half-a-loaf” experiments to design
workable studies); David H. Kaye & David A. Freedman, Reference Guide on Statistics, in
REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 83 (Federal Judicial Ctr. ed., 2d ed. 2000).
62.
For a variety of examples of this rhetorical move, see those discussed in Cole, supra
note 45, at 235–40. For a recent example of an analysis that makes use of this argument, see, for
example, Peter E. Peterson et al., Latent Prints: A Perspective on the State of the Science, 11
SCI.
COMM.,
(2009),
available
at
FORENSIC
http://www2.fbi.gov/hq/lab/fsc/backissu/oct2009/review/2009_10_review01.htm.
This Article
does recognize in passing that latent examiners “do not compare friction ridge skin directly” but
rather examine two-dimensional representations that may introduce additional interpretive
concerns. Id. But while numerous citations are offered in support of the premises of persistence
and individuality of friction ridge skin, the only citation offered to support the claim that latent
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assertion that every fingerprint is different is an inductive claim that cannot
definitively be proven empirically (because it is impossible to look at every
fingerprint that has ever existed or will exist), the available empirical
evidence does support the claims that a high degree of variation in human
friction ridge detail exists and that an individual’s friction ridges persist to a
63
substantial degree over her lifetime. Most of us would even be willing to
infer, based on what is known, that every human being has prints
observably distinguishable from those of every other at some “scale of
64
detection.”
65
But this claim of variability of rolled or digitized fingerprints does not
establish that fingerprint examiners can therefore individualize prints
recovered from crime scenes to a particular source or even that the
techniques of fingerprint comparison necessarily “work.” The right
question is not whether all fingerprints actually differ from each other, but
rather what conclusions the methods of fingerprint comparison permit, and
in what circumstances. Even if every set of ten prints is different from every
other, two specific portions of two prints from different individuals might be
extraordinarily similar to one another. And even if every area of friction
ridge skin is different from every other individual’s inked or scanned print,
that does not answer whether two such prints from different sources might
share enough similarity that an examiner, even if competently using the
techniques of the field, might nonetheless mistakenly attribute them to the
same unique source.
Moreover, latent print analysis involves difficulties often not present
in the analysis of ten prints: Latent images are frequently smaller in surface
area than the full print; they are possibly distorted; and they often contain
impressions “translate reliably as a true and accurate representation of what appears on the friction
ridge skin” is an untitled FBI laboratory manuscript listed as “in preparation.” Id.
63.
See, e.g., Christopher Champod & Pierre A. Margot, Computer Assisted Analysis of
Minutiæ Occurrences on Fingerprints, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON
FINGERPRINT DETECTION AND IDENTIFICATION 305–18 (Joseph Almog & Eliot Springer eds.,
1996); Anil K. Jain et al., On the Similarity of Identical Twin Fingerprints, 35 PATTERN
RECOGNITION 2653 (2002); Neumann et al., supra note 32, at 54–64; Cédric Neumann et al.,
Computation of Likelihood Ratios in Fingerprint Identification for Configurations of Three Minutiae, 51
J. FORENSIC SCI. 1255 (2006); Egli, N., Interpretation of Partial Fingermarks Using an Automated
Fingerprint Identification System. PhD, Institut de Police Scientifique et Ecole des Sciences
Criminelles, Université de Lausanne, Lausanne, Suisse: 2009; Ne’urim, Israel, June 26–30, 1995:
Israel National Police.
64.
See KEITH INMAN & NORAH RUDIN, PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF CRIMINALISTICS:
THE PROFESSION OF FORENSIC SCIENCE 128 (2001).
65.
A rolled fingerprint is an impression made with ink—usually black ink on white
paper—where the individual rolls his inked finger to create a visible impression. Digitized
fingerprints involve scanning the friction ridge impression electronically rather than using ink.
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artifacts resulting from the processes necessary to make a latent print
66
visible. So, the right question is whether, competently using the tools and
techniques of latent fingerprint identification, two impressions from two
different sources might ever be mistaken as coming from the same source
(or, conversely, whether two impressions from the same finger might
erroneously be said to come from different sources). Whether the actual
ridge patterns on the two fingers in question are or are not “truly” the same
is not the critical question. These are significantly different inquiries. The
point is to recognize that the claim that friction ridge patterns are highly
variable might be a necessary precondition for fingerprint identification,
but it does not establish fingerprint analysts’ ability to make a match. To
suggest otherwise reflects a failure to think carefully and critically about the
relationship between an empirical warrant and the claim that is being
made.
Numerous examples within the forensic sciences reveal dogma or
ideology trumping academic inquiry. For example, in 2001, two forensic
science researchers, one of whom was a trained and qualified fingerprint
examiner in Switzerland, published a commentary on fingerprint
67
identification. In it, they called for abandoning “absolute conclusions.”
The authors recognized the inherently probabilistic nature of fingerprint
evidence; they allowed that the key question was not the uniqueness of
friction ridge skin, but rather the analyst’s ability to recognize sufficient
information from very limited information; and they advocated replacing
experience-and-tradition-based approaches with more transparent and
68
empirically justified practices. How were these arguments received? At
least one commentator responded in print with abject hostility at the
69
notion that interloping statisticians would dare upset the apple cart. This
angry critic wrote:
Once again, identification science is under attack, this time from a
shotgun blast by statisticians. They come not to bury fingerprints but
to praise it. But as with Shakespeare’s Mark Antony, they actually
come to incite a riot. Although their main point is relatively simple,

66.
To be sure, not all fingerprint comparisons involve latent prints. Sometimes prints
found in crime scenes are patent prints—left in ink, blood, or otherwise visible without dusting or
processing.
67.
Christophe Champod & Ian W. Evett, A Probabilistic Approach to Fingerprint Evidence,
51 J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 101 (2001).
68.
Id.
69.
See Steve McKasson, I Think Therefore I Probably Am, 51 J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION
217 (2001).

58:3

Mnookin et al

Mnookin Final Proof 1

(1/12/2011 3:41:00 PM)

30

DRAFT: Do not cite
it is mired deeply in rhetoric. One might describe it as opaque rather
70
than transparent.

The author later asserts:
This commentary is indeed a vicious attack and any identification
expert who does not see it as such has not read it closely enough.
Surely the authors cannot expect that this will cause the scales to fall
from the eyes of examiners everywhere and that the errors of the last
hundred years will be revealed at last . . . . What then can be their
71
motive for putting this forward at this time?

He finally adds:
As with most propaganda, it is masked, although not particularly well
in this instance . . . . Although this article may be intended to
demonstrate that identification specialists do not know enough about
statistics, what it has clearly demonstrated is that statisticians do not
72
know enough about identification.

It is not clear which is more worthy of note: the vitriol and sarcasm of
the response, or the fact that the journal published it notwithstanding this
extraordinary tone.
More recently, in the face of evidence presented in another article that
73
contextual information may bias the decisions of fingerprint analysts, one
commentator responded with the following statements in a letter to the
editor:
[A]ny fingerprint examiner who comes to a decision on identification
and is swayed either way in that decisionmaking process under the
influence of stories and gory images is either totally incapable of
performing the noble tasks expected of him/her or is so immature
that he/she should seek employment at Disneyland. . . . And I do
find it rather unsavoury that those within our own ranks, who ought
to know better and are aware just how reliable the fingerprint system
is, continue to provide fuel for those within the media and Press who
seem to relish attacking what is the most valuable tool in the
74
investigating officer’s armoury.

Rather than discuss the merits of the research, the letter writer attacks
those test subjects who showed themselves to be susceptible to biasing
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
231.
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information as incompetent or immature. Given that psychological
research shows that all humans are potentially susceptible to the effects of
biasing information, this letter writer essentially proposed that fingerprint
examiners might best make a mass exodus to Disneyland.
To be sure, these examples of blustery responses to unwelcome points
of view obviously do not represent the views and attitudes of all forensic
practitioners. But neither response provoked any apparent public outrage
from the forensic science community. Not a single follow-up letter was
published, criticizing these authors for their sputtering and dogmatic
responses to thoughtful research and analysis.
Admittedly, human endeavors are quite frequently dotted with
75
examples of resistance to new theories that challenge the status quo.
Regardless, a sign of a mature discipline with a well-entrenched research
culture is a willingness to engage respectfully with opposing viewpoints; it is
a commitment to focusing on the merits of proposed theories, the
adequacies of research methodologies, and the assessments of the data
rather than resorting to inflated rhetoric or personal attacks. Forensic
scientists have sometimes found it too easy to respond with a personal
attack instead of—or layered on top of—substantive assessment of critics’
arguments. Even one of the authors of this Article regrets portions of one
of his early publications that now seem to him to have taken too derisive a
tone toward some of the critics of forensic science (including, indeed, other
76
authors of this Article). In a research culture, participants should, ideally,
learn from disagreements rather than fear them. We believe it is a
significant step forward that those who have found themselves (literally) on
opposite sides of the courtroom are now, by coauthoring this Article, not
only willing to engage with one another, but are finding many shared views.
But the development of a research culture in these areas still has a long way
to go.
When accused of being insufficiently research-based, or insufficiently
linked to academia, practitioners in the pattern identification fields have
75.
Consider, for example, Thomas Kuhn’s famous book, The Structure of Scientific
Revolutions, and his arguments and examples detailing how “normal science” frequently proceeds
even in the face of anomalous findings, and how most researchers in any given paradigm remain
bound to it notwithstanding contradictory evidence. THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF
SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1962). For further examples, see Bernard Barber, Resistance by
Scientists to Scientific Discovery, 134 SCIENCE 596 (1961). Given these attitudes in areas with
robust commitments to a research culture, it is not surprising to find similar dynamics in an area
where the research culture commitment remains weak.
76.
Glenn Langenburg, Defense Against the Dark Arts, 43 CHESAPEAKE EXAMINER 1, 5-6,
12 (2003).

58:3

Mnookin et al

Mnookin Final Proof 1

(1/12/2011 3:41:00 PM)

32

DRAFT: Do not cite

sometimes responded by invoking the scientific foundations articulated by
the pioneers of their fields. Whatever the qualifications of these early
practitioners, in a healthy research culture, the scientific bona fides of a
profession would be unlikely to depend on these pioneers of the distant
past. For example, one published response to an article criticizing the lack
of adequate scientific foundation in the forensic sciences emphasized the
academic credentials of forensic pioneers like Calvin Goddard, J. Howard
77
Goddard (1891–1955) trained as a
Mathews, and Sir Francis Galton.
physician, spent his career partly in the military, and substantially
contributed to the establishment of forensic firearms comparison as a field.
J. Howard Mathews (1881–1970) published a major firearms treatise in
78
1962, ten years after retiring from an academic position in chemistry. Sir
Francis Galton (1822–1911) was a significant scientific intellectual of the
Victorian era, with interests as diverse as meteorology, eugenics, heredity,
79
Without belittling the significant
statistical analysis, and fingerprints.
intellectual contributions of these pioneers, a robust research culture should
be continuous and current. Century-old work or the credentials of
pioneers, however impressive, has little direct relevance to questions of
80
present-day scientific legitimacy.
Another major limitation of the current forensic science culture
relates to several of the publication venues for the pattern identification
field. Several of the most significant journals focused on publishing pattern
identification research simply do not comport with broader norms of access,
dissemination, or peer review typically associated with scientific publishing.
For example, the AFTE Journal, a quarterly publication of the Association
of Firearm and Toolmark Examiners, has published numerous articles on
81
firearms identification. Worldcat—the largest online catalog of library
77.
CRIME LAB REPORT, FORENSIC PATTERN IDENTIFICATION: A HISTORY LESSON, AND
SOME
ADVICE,
FOR
SAKS
AND
FAIGMAN
4
(2009),
available
at
http://www.crimelabreport.com/library/pdf/1-09.pdf.
78.
1 J. HOWARD MATHEWS, FIREARMS IDENTIFICATION (2d ed. 1973).
79.
See generally MICHAEL BULMER & FRANCIS GALTON, PIONEER OF HEREDITY AND
BIOMETRY (2003).
80.
For similar observations concerning the handwriting identification, see Risinger et al.,
supra note 35, at 738–40. The handful of formal studies on the “black box” reliability of signature
authentication has not changed the almost exclusive practical reliance on century-old sources. Id.
at 773.
81.
Many of the articles claimed by firearms analysts to validate their practices have been
published in AFTE. See, e.g., Ronald G. Nichols, Defending the Scientific Foundation of the Firearms
and Tool Mark Identification Discipline: Responding to Recent Challenges, 52 J. FORENSIC SCI. 586
(2007). We take no position here on whether these publications and research bases provide an
adequate foundation for the claims of firearms identification. Our point is that this journal is
deemed by members of the community to be a critical publication venue. For a view critical of
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materials, which includes the holdings of 72,000 libraries worldwide,
including virtually every university-based library in the United States—lists
82
only eighteen libraries with a copy of this journal in their holdings.
Furthermore, the AFTE Journal does not appear to be indexed or included
83
The only available index to
in any major indexing service anywhere.
AFTE was created by an individual firearms examiner on his own initiative
84
and was not continued past 2005. Moreover, peer review of submissions
to AFTE is not blind; the author and the reviewer are both aware of each
85
other’s identity. In addition, the peer reviewers appear to come entirely
from the editorial board, which consists entirely of AFTE members, and ,
therefore includes no members from outside the toolmark and firearms
86
This journal therefore appears to have
practitioner community).
extremely limited dissemination beyond the members of AFTE itself;
completely lacks integration with any of the voluminous networks for the
production and exchange of scientific research information; and engages in
peer review that is neither blind nor draws upon an extensive network of
the research basis of firearms comparison claims, see Adina Schwartz, A Systemic Challenge to the
Reliability and Admissibility of Firearms and Toolmark Identification, 6 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV.
1 (2005).
82.
WorldCat lists a total of nineteen libraries in three separate file listings. However, the
Library of Congress is listed twice. The American libraries that subscribe to AFTE are, in full: Cal
State, Sacramento; George Washington University; Stetson University College of Law; Ogeechee
Technical College; Grambling State University; Truman State University; John Jay College of
Criminal Justice; Case Western Law School; Mercyhurst College Hammermill Library; George
Mason University; Virginia Commonwealth University; and the Library of Congress. To be sure,
Worldcat’s listings may to a certain degree understate access. First, despite its extensive
inclusions, we recognize that some libraries are not in Worldcat. Second, we recognize that at
some institutions, if an individual faculty member has a subscription, the library may elect not to
pay for institutional access. However, this issue should have a potential effect on all journals
associated with membership organizations, not simply forensic science journals; and by any
standard, the number of research libraries subscribing to AFTE is remarkably small. Moreover, a
faculty member with access significantly limits broader dissemination to those outside the
individual faculty member’s ambit.
83.
This information comes from Ulrichsweb, an authoritative source of information on
periodicals.
See generally ULRICHSWEB—THE GLOBAL SOURCE FOR PERIODICALS,
http://www.ulrichsweb.com/ulrichsweb/ (last visited Dec. 30, 2010).
84.
This index can be downloaded at AFTE Journal Keyword Index ASS’N OF FIREARM &
TOOL MARK EXAMINERS (Oct. 24, 2005), http://www.afte.org/ExamResources/journalindex.htm.
It appears to be the individual work of an Albuquerque Police Department firearms examiner.
85.
See the description at AFTE Peer Review Process, ASS’N OF FIREARM & TOOL MARK
EXAMINERS (Aug. 2009), http://www.afte.org/Journal/PeerReviewProcess.htm; see also Dominic J.
Denio, The History of the AFTE Journal, the Peer Review Process, and Daubert Issues, AFTE J.,
Spring 2002, at 210, 210–14.
86.
Indeed, AFTE membership is, for the most part, open only to practicing firearms and
toolmark examiners (or those in training for the profession). For membership categories, see
http://www.afte.org/Membership/membership.htm. For a list of the editorial review panel, see
http://www.afte.org/Journal/EditorsCommittee.htm.
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researchers. None of this is compatible with an accessible, rigorous,
87
transparent culture of research.
The Journal for Forensic Identification (JFI), the journal of the
International Association of Identification, suffers from similar limitations,
though to a slightly lesser degree. Worldcat reports seventy-two libraries
that contain print holdings of the journal and 123 that subscribe to the
88
electronic version through ProQuest. (The JFI is included in a few major
indexes, including ProQuest and SCOPUS. This quantum of accessibility
may be adequate to permit an intrepid researcher to locate materials
published within JFI. But it still fails to meet conventional standards of
89
research access. Indeed, the JFI is not even listed in the Web of Science, a
large collection of more than 10,000 journals over a wide range of areas.
Like the AFTE Journal, it is not analyzed in the databases assessing journal

87.
For a discussion of the nature of scientific peer review, see KAYE, BERNSTEIN &
MNOOKIN, supra note 3, § 7.3.2(b).
88.
JFI does come in an electronic version, but it is available to libraries only with purchase
of a large and expensive criminal justice periodicals package, rather than by itself. This also
suggests that some of the electronic holders were not specifically choosing the JFI but received it
along with whatever sources led them to the aggregate database. Whatever their motivation,
access is access, and the subscribers to the larger database are providing access to those with access
to that library. Some institutions subscribe to both the electronic and the print versions, so the
total number of libraries providing access to the journal is slightly fewer than adding the two
numbers would suggest. However, it appears that Worldcat likely understates electronic access, as
not every library that lists with Worldcat lists every electronic holding they receive as part of a
package. A call to ProQuest confirmed that JFI is not available for subscription alone but is a part
of the Criminal Justice Periodicals Index. The ProQuest representative indicated that there are
more than two hundred subscribers to this database but was unable to provide any more exact
figures. Assuming that this number is accurate, it suggests either that some subscribers are not
members of Worldcat, some subscribers are not listing their electronic access on Worldat, or, as is
most likely, a combination of both. Therefore Worldcat’s numbers for electronic access need to
be taken with a grain of salt. However, this electronic access subscription number for JFI can still
be loosely compared with that of other journals. There is no reason to believe that libraries would
be less likely to report this specific holding as opposed to other electronic holdings, so relative
comparisons are likely meaningful, even if the specific number cannot be trusted.
89.
It would be unfair to compare JFI to the major publishing venues of a broad scientific or
social scientific discipline, as pattern identification is a subfield of forensic science. A more
reasonable comparison might be, for example, Social Studies of Science, the journal published by an
academic association (the Society for the Social Study of Science) with many fewer members than
the IAI, and associated with an extremely small academic subfield (sociology of science). This
journal is listed on Worldcat as having 543 subscribers to the print version and 712 to the internet
version. Like the JFI numbers, this electronic number likely understates access, probably even
more substantially than JFI. Social Studies of Science is available as a package through its publisher,
Sage. It is not clear that libraries providing access through Sage, or through the widely available
JSTOR, would list such access on Worldcat, or that those libraries that provide both print and
electronic access would include two separate listings in the catalog.
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90

The JFI also gives its authors “plaques” to mark the fact of
impact.
publication. While this could be viewed as a nice gesture to recognize an
author’s efforts and to spur submissions, it is certainly not a practice widely
seen in other disciplines, and it implicitly treats publication as an unusual
accomplishment, rather than an expected consequence of engaging in
research. Fingerprint Whorld, a quarterly United Kingdom−based journal
that provides another important source of information to fingerprint
examiners, is similarly difficult to acquire through libraries.
Several other publications include pattern-identification-related
articles, most notably the American Academy of Forensic Sciences’s Journal
91
of Forensic Sciences (JFS); and Forensic Science International (FSI)
(published in Europe). These journals have a significantly greater degree of
library dissemination and meet more of the typical indicia expected for
research journals. They are widely indexed (including in Scopus, Pubmed,
Medline, Web of Science, and numerous other locations), and they are
included among the 7300 scientific journals that are assessed for impact by
the ISI/Web of Knowledge. However, it is perhaps worth noting that none
of the top fifty most cited articles in either JFS or FSI relates to pattern
92
This does not discredit those articles in pattern
identification.
identification that do appear in JFS and FSI. It illustrates, however, both
that pattern identification disciplines make up only a small portion of the
journals’ overall focus, and that none of the journals’ most well-known and
93
widely cited articles come from these fields. While the JFS is both peer
reviewed and adequately disseminated to a broad research and practitioner

90.
Impact ratings are an effort to evaluate how much scholarly ‘impact’ specific journals or
individual articles may have. Impact ratings, which focus on how often journal articles are cited,
are imperfect proxies for journal influence and quality. Nonetheless, it is fair to conclude that an
unrated journal has a low impact.
91.
Worldcat has 919 listings for the print version and 301 for the electronic version of
JFS. The same caveats about these numbers apply. Note also that the journal is listed multiple
times, and these numbers derive from adding the various listings without cross-checking for
possible duplicate listings. Note also that many print subscribers likely also have electronic access.
92.
This was established by searching the ISI/Web of Knowledge by journal title and
sorting by times cited. For a broader (but slightly dated) analysis of what topics in forensic science
are highly cited, see Alan W. Jones, Which Articles and Which Topics in the Forensic Sciences are
Highly Cited, 45 SCI. & JUST. 175 (2005). In Jones’s analysis, the topics garnering the most
citations came from toxicology, criminalistics (almost entirely DNA-related), and pathology. Id.
at 178–80. Whether these disparities are solely the result of population differences across different
forensic specialties, or also reflect meaningful differences in the quantum of research engagement,
cannot be determined without further study.
93.
To be fair, pattern identification fields make up a relatively small portion of the total
membership of the AAFS. However, this underscores the value of having a serious, welldisseminated journal focusing on these areas in particular.
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community, from the perspective of generating a robust research culture in
the forensic sciences, one aspect of the AAFS policy is troubling.
Presenting new research at the AAFS’ annual meeting obligates the
presenter to give the JFS a right of first refusal (albeit unenforceable) on the
94
relevant material. While the JFS is a reputable journal, a researcher’s
publication options should not be restricted because of presentation to the
forensic science community. Forensic science would benefit from broader
dissemination and more frequent publication in high-impact journals that
95
are not exclusively geared to the forensic sciences.
While we firmly believe that an adequate research culture does not yet
exist in the pattern and impression evidence disciplines, and is distressingly
weak throughout many areas of forensic science, we are more interested in
thinking constructively about how to remedy this situation than in pointing
fingers and assessing blame. However, to prevent misunderstanding, it is
worth making several points explicit. First, in our view, this lack of a
research culture is not forensic scientists’ fault. The two most significant
causes are a dearth of funding and the fact that prosecutors, investigators,
and the courts are the primary clients of forensic science. Until recently,
very little federal grant money was available for non-DNA forensic science
96
This lack of funding, combined with the general paucity of
research.
resources in triage-driven, overworked laboratories, made research an
exceedingly unlikely central priority. In addition, few practitioners had the
background skills to develop substantial research programs even if the
institutional climate had supported it.
Equally significant, even after Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
97
Inc. emphasized the need for judicial gatekeeping to assure the validity of
94.
See Info for Authors, AM. ACAD. OF FORENSIC SCIS., http://www.aafs.org/info-authors-0
(last visited Dec. 30, 2010) (“JFS reserves the right of first consideration for publication of any
work accepted for presentation at an annual meeting of the AAFS, and authors must not submit
their work elsewhere for a period of six months following the annual meeting at which the work
was presented. If a manuscript has not been accepted for publication, or is not under active
consideration by JFS, at the end of the six-month period, the interest of JFS in the manuscript
automatically terminates.”).
95.
Given this rule, it is not surprising that one recent study found that a majority of those
papers presented at the AAFS that were later published in a peer-reviewed journal were published
in the JFS. Silvia Tambuscio et al., From Abstract to Publication: The Fate of Research Presented at
an Annual Forensic Meeting, 55 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1494, 1496 (2010). The same study also found
that, in the annual meeting studied, only 16.4 percent of research presentations led to publication,
a lower number than the vast majority of presentation-to-publication ratios that have been
studied. Id. This unusually low publication ratio is yet another indicator of the lack of a robust
research culture.
96.
Max M. Houck, A Vicious Cycle, 1 FORENSIC SCI. POL’Y & MGMT. 123, 124 (2009).
97.
509 U.S. 579 (1993).
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expert evidence in court, most judges confronted with pattern
98
identification evidence have continued to admit it without restriction. If
courts are not going to insist upon better evidence of validity, if they are
instead going to continue to permit forensic scientists to reach extremely
strong conclusions about their own abilities to make identifications, and if
legal challenges remain both relatively rare and generally unsuccessful, then
why should the forensic science community consider changing its practices?
If an examiner is permitted, indeed expected, to express extremely high
confidence about an individualization, what incentives exist to pursue
research that would, at best, justify this confidence, and at worst, reveal
hitherto unrecognized limitations?
The judicial response to these
identification techniques has therefore been a powerful force both enabling
and preserving this status quo. If a few more brave judges had required
additional evidence to support the claims being made and mandated a
closer fit between claims made and the research supporting them, the
forensic science community would have had an extremely strong incentive
99
to develop and provide precisely this information.
Moreover, most practicing forensic scientists in pattern and impression
evidence, and in most other forensic disciplines as well, are not actually
qualified to pursue the necessary research.
Until recently, many
laboratories did not necessarily require a college degree or any formal

98.
For discussion of these admissibility challenges, see FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 3.
Some recent cases evincing more skepticism, though generally still admitting the evidence, are
discussed in KAYE, BERNSTEIN & MNOOKIN, supra note 3, and Mnookin, supra note 4, at 1212–
13, 1241–65. For an interesting procedural order from one district court judge, see Procedural
Order: Trace Evidence, No. 1:08-cr-10104-NG (D. Mass. Mar. 8, 2010), available at
http://www.swgfast.org/Resources/100310-GertnerProceduralOrder.pdf (making clear that in the
wake of the NAS Report, admissibility of such forensic science evidence “ought not to be
presumed; that it has to be carefully examined in each case, and tested in the light of the NAS
concerns, the concerns of Daubert/Kumho case law, and Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence,” and describing pretrial procedures to govern any such challenges).
99.
See Mnookin, supra note 4; Risinger & Saks, supra note 46, at 65–66; D. Michael
Risinger, Goodbye To All That or a Fool’s Errand, by One of the Fools: How I Stopped Worrying
About Court Responses to Handwriting Identification (and “Forensic Science” in General) and Learned
to Love Misinterpretations of Kumho Tire v. Carmichael, 43 TULSA L. REV. 447, 471–75 (2007).
Some judges have evinced genuine concern about whether some pattern identification passes
Daubert, and some have restricted the evidence (for example, by permitting descriptions of
similarities but no conclusion regarding identity, or by prohibiting claims of absolute certainty
about identity to the exclusion of all others) or occasionally excluded it. For examples of these
approaches, see United States. v. Taylor, 663 F. Supp. 2d 1157 (D.N.M. 2009); United States v.
Green, 405 F. Supp. 2d 104 (D. Mass. 2005); United States v. Llera Plaza, 179 F. Supp. 2d 492
(E.D. Pa. 2002), vacated, 188 F. Supp. 2d 549 (E.D. Pa. 2002); United States v. Hines, 55 F. Supp.
2d 62 (D. Mass. 1999); Maryland v. Rose, No. K06-0545 (Md. 2007). However, most
admissibility challenges have resulted in the admission of the pattern evidence without restriction.
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science training. Even those with a BS in forensic science or some other
scientific discipline have not typically received significant training in the
development of research design. Experience may provide the basis for
determining what questions to ask, but most pattern identification analysts,
even with entirely noble intentions, would not be qualified to design or
develop sophisticated research projects to answer those questions. We
neither fault these practitioners for failing to do so, nor do we expect them
to become primarily focused on research themselves. We do, however,
expect them to become more sophisticated in thinking about data and the
legitimacy of inference. Expecting most practicing pattern analysts to
become PhD-level researchers is not realistic, nor is it even a good idea. If,
however, practitioners at all levels operated within a research culture, they
would hone their critical thinking skills and regularly question what basis
supports their claim to knowledge, both in an individual case, and more
broadly in a given discipline. Moreover, while all laboratory personnel
need not, and indeed should not, be researchers themselves, it would not be
unrealistic to require certain key personnel—perhaps the lead technical
worker in a unit, and whoever is authorized to approve standard operating
procedures—to have some minimum research qualification and experience.

IV.

CREATING A RESEARCH CULTURE: SOME POSSIBLE STEPS
TOWARD CHANGE

Culture is sticky. We fully recognize that cultural change does not
come easily, and we do not mean to assume naively that the culture of
pattern identification can be modified with ease. We do believe that the
current controversies, the NAS Report, and its aftermath create the
opportunity for both greater self-reflection and cultural change. We already
see a number of positive developments and glimmers of future changes on
101
the horizon.
100.
Peterson et al., supra note 62 (noting that while in the past, “examiners were required
to have, at a minimum, a high school diploma,” many labs are increasing educational
requirements). SWGFAST recommends that new entrants to the field have a minimum of a
college degree from an accredited institution that included scientific coursework. See SCIENTIFIC
WORKING GROUP ON FRICTION RIDGE ANALYSIS, STUDY & TECHNOLOGY, STANDARDS FOR
MINIMUM QUALIFICATIONS AND TRAINING TO COMPETENCY FOR FRICTION RIDGE EXAMINER
TRAINEES
(2010),
available
at
http://www.swgfast.org/documents/qualificationscompetency/100310_Qualifications_Training_Competency_FR_1.0.pdf.
101.
For a few examples of interesting developments, see IAI Resolution 2010–18, supra
note 23 (reflecting a “change [in] the official position of the Association related to Friction Ridge
Examinations based on advances in the science and scientific research” by no longer prohibiting
fingerprint examiners from testifying in probabilistic language); the NIST/NIJ working group on
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In this final Part of the Article, we wish to describe briefly a variety of
steps that could help to create and institutionalize a research culture within
the pattern identification sciences. Is every one of these necessary? Taken
together, would they be sufficient? We are not certain of the answer to
either of these questions, but we do believe that these suggestions would
offer meaningful and constructive steps toward positive change.
Our suggestions also reflect an effort to be realistic about what is
possible. For this reason, we are not calling for the courts to transform their
approach to the admissibility of forensic science. Many (though not all) of
us believe that this would be intellectually appropriate and, while
potentially disruptive in the short run, could also have beneficial cultural
effects in the medium term. If, for example, courts insisted on better errorrate information as a precondition for admissibility, the incentives for its
production would dramatically increase. Given that the legal system is the
major client for forensic science, the requirements courts impose will
naturally, and perhaps inevitably, influence what quantum and what kinds
of research are deemed necessary by the community itself. Indeed, to a
significant degree, the current state of affairs is the direct product of the
courts’ nearly nonexistent gatekeeping for these forms of evidence. Had the
102
courts applied Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. with an
intensity in the forensic sciences similar to that seen in, say, the toxic torts
arena, there is little doubt that the forensic science community would have
become forceful advocates for whatever research seemed necessary to justify
103
Instead, while some judges have engaged in a certain
admissibility.
degree of hand wringing, few have actually insisted upon empirical data to
support forensic examiners’ claims. Unfortunately, given their responses to
forensic science challenges over the past few years, the Daubert test’s

Human Factors in Friction Ridge Identification, which has brought together a broad range of
perspectives and signals a welcome willingness of leaders of the fingerprint community to engage
with academics ranging from statisticians to law professors; an NSF-funded workshop at
Northwestern bringing together cognitive psychologists not previously involved in forensic
inquiries with forensic science practitioners; a procedural order by a district court judge signaling a
clear willingness to take the issues raised by the NAS Report seriously (detailed in supra note 98);
NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, COMM. ON SCI., SUBCOMM. ON FORENSIC SCI.,
http://www.forensicscience.gov (last visited Dec. 30, 2010) (describing the creation by the White
House’s Office of Science and Technology Policy of a Subcommittee on Forensic Science, “to
assess the practical challenges of implementing recommendations in the 2009 National Research
Council (NRC) report,” and to advise the White House regarding how to achieve the Report’s
goals).
102.
509 U.S. 579 (1993).
103.
But see Joseph Sanders, Applying Daubert Inconsistently?: Proof of Individual Causation in
Toxic Tort and Forensic Cases, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 1367 (2010).
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fuzziness and flexibility, and the limited appellate review that an ‘abuse-ofdiscretion’ standard provides, there is little reason to believe that the
judiciary will become a force that spurs cultural transformation in the
forensic sciences.
Most of us support the idea of creating an independent entity (such as
the National Institute of Forensic Science (NIFS) recommended by the
NAS) that supports and governs the forensic science community, including
its research activities. We believe that the major reforms that we and
others have called for would best be accomplished via a corresponding
structural change and through the leadership and oversight that a new
agency, if carefully conceived and implemented, could provide. But while
the Senate Judiciary Committee is considering a legislative proposal that
may create an independent entity within the National Institute of Justice to
104
pursue some of what NIFS might have accomplished, the politics of
creating a new federal agency seem unmanageable at the moment.
Given our pessimism regarding the likelihood that the courts will
be major agents of change, or that a new agency will transform these fields,
what, then, can and should be done to improve the research culture within
these fields?
A.

Increased Funding

One of the biggest obstacles to forensic science research has been the
absence of specific federal funding to support it. The National Science
105
Foundation (NSF) has at times funded forensic science research projects,
but the NSF focuses on fundamental, rather than applied research. Some of
the necessary research within these fields may make important
methodological and theoretical contributions to broader disciplines, such as
104.
See Int’l Ass’n for Identification, Preliminary Outline of Draft Forensic Reform
Legislation
(May
5,
2010),
available
at
http://www.theiai.org/current_affairs/20100505_Draft_Outline_of_Forensic_Reform_Legislation.p
df; see also Letter From Joseph P. Bono, President, Am. Acad. of Forensic Scis., to The Honorable
Patrick J. Leahy, Chairman, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary (June 14, 2010), available at
http://www.aafs.org/sites/default/files/pdf/AAFSResponseToDraftOutline14June2010.pdf.
105.
A search of the NSF database reveals at least six funded projects that are squarely
connected to forensic science: Cognitive Bias and Forensic Science, Jonathan J. Koehler;
Understanding Jurors Use of Highly Diagnostic Statistical Evidence, Jonathan Koehler; Statistical
Methods for Fingerprint Image Analysis, Sarat Dass; Why Do Forensic Evaluators With Access to the
Same Information Come to Different Conclusions When Retained by Opposing Sides in Legal
Proceedings?, Marcus Boccaccini & Daniel Murie; Jurors’ Evaluations of Forensic Science, William
C. Thompson; and, Dissertation Research: Taming the Hypervariable Witness: The Introduction,
Contestation, and Regulation of Forensic DNA Evidence in the American Legal System, John Beatty.
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probability theory, statistics, decision research, and cognitive psychology.
These kinds of projects might be appropriate for NSF funding. But much of
the research critical for the forensic sciences may not make a novel
methodological or theoretical contribution to other academic fields. NSF
does not traditionally fund these more applied forms of inquiry. Forensic
science research (apart from DNA profiling) has not received significant
106
For example, until very recently,
funding through other sources either.
the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) funded very little foundational
107
research in the pattern identification sciences. This has begun to change
in the last year, partly as a function of the NAS Report itself. In 2009, NIJ
posted a solicitation for funding up to $10 million to applications proposing
“Fundamental Research to Improve Understanding of the Accuracy,
108
Reliability, and Measurement Validity of Forensic Science Disciplines.”
109
In addition, the National
Similar solicitations appeared in 2010.
Institute of Standards for Technology (NIST), the Department of Defense,
the Department of Homeland Security, and the FBI have begun to provide
some additional, albeit still limited, funding for pattern identification
110
research.
These numbers, while far better than nothing, are a drop in the
111
More funding—and some stable and consistent forms of
bucket.
funding—is critical for a research culture to take root and flourish. These
funding sources sorely need to be independent from law enforcement.
Solicitations should be as broad in scope and as widely disseminated as
possible to encourage greater involvement from discipline-based academic
researchers from fields like physical science, psychology, statistics, and
computer science. Funding could help attract creative, cutting-edge work
from diverse researchers applying the methods and techniques of their
fields. While forensic science has not typically been a domain of major
inquiry for these disciplines, substantial funding will likely pique the
112
interest of some academic researchers from a variety of disciplines.
106.
See, e.g., Houck, supra note 96, at 124 (showing paltry federal research funding for
forensic science compared with other fields of science and engineering).
107.
An earlier NIJ solicitation was withdrawn in the wake of an early Daubert challenge to
fingerprint evidence. See United States v. Mitchell, 365 F. 3d 215, 232 (3d Cir. 2004).
108.
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/sl000878.pdf.
109.
Several of the coauthors of this Article have applied for and/or received NIJ funding
under these solicitations and others.
110.
For example, see the listings at http://www.tswg.gov/subgroups/isf/isf.html.
111.
Houck, supra note 96, at 123–24.
112.
We note that selection of funding recipients must also operate in accordance with the
values of a research culture. Nonresearching practitioners should not substantively evaluate the
research design merits of proposals, except in relation to practical concerns about which their
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Improving Forensic Education to Enhance a Research Culture

In addition to encouraging greater participation from university-based
researchers from a variety of fields, we strongly believe that forensic science
would benefit from the emergence of a cohort of individuals with the skills
and the background to operate both in the academic research community
and in the world of practitioners. Currently, in the pattern identification
field, the number of practicing analysts with a PhD in any discipline is quite
small indeed. (This is in stark contrast to a number of other forensic fields,
including DNA analysis and toxicology, in which a significant number of
113
analysts hold PhDs).
The majority of forensic practitioners in pattern identification need
not—and should not—pursue PhDs. But if some relatively small fraction of
practitioners were full citizens of both the world of research and the world
of practice, it would offer enormously beneficial spillover effects. These
practitioner-researcher hybrids could wear two hats by being true insiders in
both communities. They would be valuable translators, mediators, and
educators in both domains. They could both convey to fellow practitioners
the need for a research-based approach and contribute to ensuring that
research focuses on areas of genuine and important concern to
114
practitioners.

experience produces expertise. Practitioners’ views on what research questions are important, and
why, can absolutely be considered, and if research proposals make unwarranted or naïve
assumptions about how laboratories operate, that too is relevant to evaluation. But the academic
merits of any given research design should be assessed by those with the research qualifications to
evaluate them. A recent report revealed a failure of precisely these values at the National
Institute of Justice, which suggests that it might be a problematic choice to spearhead the forensic
reform effort. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE AUDIT OF THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE’S PRACTICES FOR AWARDING
GRANTS AND CONTRACTS IN FISCAL YEARS 2005 THROUGH 2007, at xxiii–xxiv (2009). While
we strongly advocate greater funding for fundamental forensic science research, we recognize that
funding will only produce useful research and strengthen the research culture if it is administered
and distributed in ways concordant with the values of a research culture. It is worth noting that
both institutional capacity concerns and the need for independence from law enforcement
pressures were reasons that the NAS Report strongly urged the creation of NIFS as an entirely
new and independent agency. See NAS REPORT, supra note 8, at 20–21.
113.
Admittedly (and perhaps ironically), our evidence for both of these claims is anecdotal
and based on experience rather than the product of careful empirical study.
114.
Of course, it is theoretically possible that they would be captured by one perspective or
the other and either lose all touch with practical concerns or become highly credentialed
spokespeople for the status quo. We think, however, that precisely because culture is sticky,
significant exposure and integration into both domains will more likely produce individuals who,
like those truly bilingual in two languages, can mediate, engage, and translate in both worlds.
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Given the significant value that would result from encouraging a small
number of two-hat researcher-practitioners, the government ought to
consider funding generous competitive grants for highly qualified pattern
identification practitioners to pursue advanced graduate training in relevant
disciplines such as physical science, statistics, cognitive psychology,
computer science, or at a research-focused forensic science program. These
grants could, for example, pay half of an analyst’s salary for a period of
several years to allow the time and financial resources to pursue a PhD. A
few highly competitive and well-funded grant opportunities of this kind
would significantly contribute to the research culture of forensic science.
Another important step for creating and nurturing a research culture is
the creation of research-based forensic science programs within academic
institutions. While two-hat experts with a PhD in a substantive nonforensic field along with practical forensic experience can be key mediators
between a research culture and forensic practice, research programs also
have a place within forensic science departments. Academic forensic
research programs will not generate a research culture in the forensic
industry, but a small number of excellent research-oriented graduate
programs in forensic science could help promulgate a research culture and
could also produce valuable research. At present, most university-based
forensic education is far more focused on training future practitioners than
on training students to engage in fundamental research. We see doctoral
level training in forensic science as a supplement to, rather than a substitute
for, this appropriate focus.
This is not a new idea. A few institutions, both past and present, have
trained doctoral students to conduct significant and foundational research.
For example, at the University of California, Berkeley, Paul Kirk, and later,
John Thornton, supervised a number of PhD dissertations on the
quantitative and theoretical aspects of, among other topics, identification
115
116
117
typewriting identification,
handwriting identification,
evaluation,
118
and fingerprint identification. This was Kirk’s deliberate attempt to help

115.
Charles R. Kingston, Applications of Probability Theory in Criminalistics, 60 J. AM. STAT.
ASS’N 70 (1965); Kwan, Q.Y., “Inference of Identity of Source,” D. Crim. Dissertation, University
of California, Berkeley, 1977.
116.
D.A. Crown, A Statistical Evaluation of Typewriting Individuality (1969)
(unpublished PhD dissertation, Univ. of Cal., Berkeley).
117.
E. F. Rhodes, The Implications of Kinesthetic Factors in Forensic Handwriting
Comparisons (1978) (unpublished PhD dissertation, Univ of Cal., Berkeley).
118.
C.R. Kingston,, Probabilistic Analysis of Partial Fingerprint Patterns, (1964)
(unpublished PhD dissertation, Dissertation, Univ. of Cal., Berkeley); D.A. Stoney, A
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generate fundamental, theoretical research . Research from other early
forensic science programs, such as Michigan State University under Ralph
Turner, also contributed significantly to the literature, even though such
120
Several strong European
programs did not offer doctoral-level training.
121
examples exist as well, both historically and at present.
For the most part, however, there has been a disjunction between
academic research and the forensic laboratory. Forensic laboratories in the
United States were, from their outset, framed as arms of law enforcement
and embedded within a different system of values from academia:
Without a doubt, the laboratory, as it exists in the United States, is
an appendage of a quasi-military operation of an enforcement
agency. As in the military, the laboratory technician in the quasimilitary operation is subordinate to the administration, which is
usually not technically trained. The technician, therefore, does not
have the freedom of decision nor the opportunity for research that
would exist if he were a dedicated, well-trained scientist acting as a
122
civilian in the proper framework.

In some ways, the historical origin story of the forensic laboratory
explains the divide between research values and forensic practice. The
forensic laboratory, from the outset, was seen as bringing cutting edge
science to enhance older investigative methods (the “needle in the
123
The
haystack” method of human intelligence and shoe leather).
desirability of a laboratory—touted by the media as a new method of
124
catching criminals —led to the hasty but enthusiastic creation of new
laboratories. This perhaps contributed to the inadequate delineation of
roles between traditional investigators and scientific crime-fighters, and the
extent of oversight of scientists by sworn officers. In the meantime, though
eager for laboratories in principle, police departments did not always
appreciate what they offered, nor did they understand how to make use of

Quantitative Assessment of Fingerprint Individuality (1985) (unpublished PhD dissertation,
Univ. of Cal., Berkeley).
119.
See Paul L. Kirk, The Ontogeny of Criminalistics, 54 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE
SCI. 235 (1963).
120.
R.F. Turner, Forensic Science Education—A Perspective, in 13 AM. CHEMICAL SOC’Y
SYMPOSIUM SERIES 1.
121.
Of particular note is the forensic science program at UNIL, in Lausanne, Switzerland.
122.
C. Wilson, Crime Detection Laboratories in the United States, in FORENSIC SCIENCE:
SCIENTIFIC INVESTIGATIONS IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 96, 99–100 (J.L. Peterson ed., 1975).
123.
COLIN WILSON & DAMON WILSON, WRITTEN IN BLOOD 18–19 (2003).
124.
For an instance of plus ça change plus c’est la même chose, see Max M. Houck, CSI:
Reality, SCI. AM., July 2006, at 85.
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them in practice; at the extreme, they were an “incomprehensible”
novelty to the nonscientific police:

125

Some of these [law enforcement] agencies which are so eager to have
a laboratory have demonstrated to the author’s satisfaction that they
don’t even know what a laboratory is for. Even worse, they have
126
little or no conception of the proper use of a laboratory.

In its early days, forensic science was thus at some distance from the
academy, but at the same time, it did not comfortably inhabit the universe
of law enforcement either. To some extent, this interstitial set of
relationships, in which forensic science is neither fish nor fowl, still affects
both practice and culture.
Whatever the origin of current relationships, university-based
academic programs in forensic science can usefully assist the creation of a
research culture. We have already described the benefits of encouraging a
small number of research-based forensic science programs. A tension often
exists between disciplinary training—for example, in statistics, or
psychology—and inherently interdisciplinary training, as forensic science
education necessarily would be. But it need not be all or nothing. Some
researchers in forensic science should come from disciplines like computer
science, psychology, chemistry, biology, and statistics. But there is no
reason why others might not come from university-based forensic science
programs able to provide sophisticated training and access to disciplinary
experts in the relevant subdisciplines. This dual-track approach to forensic
research is likely to be more effective than either solely discipline-based
research, or solely forensic-science-department-based research standing
alone. We also recognize that the Forensic Science Educational Program
Accreditation Commission (FEPAC) has to date accredited thirty
undergraduate and graduate programs in North America.
More
importantly, FEPAC requires some degree of research at the graduate level
127
While we applaud this requirement, we also believe
for accreditation.
125.
W. Fong, Criminalistics and the Prosecutor, in FORENSIC SCIENCE: SCIENTIFIC
INVESTIGATION IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 122, at 371 (J.L. Peterson ed., 1975).
126.
Wilson, supra note 122 at 100. See also R. PERKINS, ELEMENTS OF POLICE SCIENCE
39–40 (1942) (“In general, American detectives do not place much weight upon the application
of scientific principles to the solution of the crimes which they are called upon to investigate.
There is a reason for this. They place more stress on their lines of information and their
acquaintance with criminals and criminal methods. . . . ‘What help,’ they say, ‘will science be in
catching pick-pockets, bunco men, swindlers, and other types of criminal offenders?’”). Bunco is
“[a] swindle perpetrated by means of card-sharping or some form of confidence trick,” from “banca,
a card-game similar to monte.” 2 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 654 (2d ed. 1989).
127.
FEPAC states:

58:3

Mnookin et al

Mnookin Final Proof 1

(1/12/2011 3:41:00 PM)

46

DRAFT: Do not cite

that carefully delineated accreditation requirements can feed a research
culture but cannot necessarily create one.
Another, perhaps more innovative, approach to integrating practical
aspects into university programs is the development and implementation of
a clinical forensic instruction program within the university system. David
Stoney has previously drawn parallels between the current state of
educational practices in modern forensic science and the state of medical
128
Stoney showed how
practice education between 1870 and 1926.
institutions such as Johns Hopkins Medical School significantly benefited
from a new innovation: the teaching hospital. Students cared for patients
and discussed cases with their clinical instructors. Students learned by
trying it for themselves, engaging in actual practice, rather than just
watching instructors or listening to lectures. Critical thinking and concrete
problem-solving ability was valued over memorization. The teaching
hospital became a center of instruction, learning, and research. The
129
teaching hospital model is similar to the atelier method of art instruction
and both approaches have something significant to recommend to forensic
science.
“Teaching forensic laboratories” would not be difficult to imagine
within a university system. These laboratories could take cases from both
the prosecution and defense. They could do initial analysis or perhaps
could be available to reanalyze evidence. They would benefit from a lack of
institutional attachment to law enforcement or structural partiality to one
Each student is required to complete an independent research project. The
research project shall culminate in a thesis, or written report of publishable quality. The
academic program must have written guidelines for the format of the thesis or report. In
addition, the results of the work shall be presented orally in a public forum for evaluation
by a committee.
The research shall be conducted in an environment conducive to research and
scholarly inquiry, and shall provide the opportunity for faculty and students to contribute
to the knowledge base of forensic science, including research directed at improving the
practice of forensic science.
A committee of at least three individuals to include faculty, forensic practitioners
and others with specialized knowledge will evaluate the project. At least one member of
the committee must be external to the department housing the academic program.
FORENSIC SCI. EDUC. PROGRAMS ACCREDITATION COMM’N, AM. ACAD. OF FORENSIC SCIS.,
ACCREDITATION STANDARDS § 5.3.2.4 (2010).
128.
See David A. Stoney, A Medical Model for Criminalistics Education, 33 J. FORENSIC SCI.
1086 (1988).
129.
This method of art instruction takes its name from the French word for “artist’s studio.”
An artist trains a small number of students in the skills and techniques associated with creating
some form of representational art, starting with more basic forms and progressing through more
complex methods. See R. LACK, THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF CLASSICAL REALISM, ON THE
TRAINING OF PAINTERS: WITH NOTES ON THE ATELIER PROGRAM (1969).
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130

Students, working under the care and instruction of
adversarial side.
trained practitioners, could learn from real-world cases and face a realistic
but challenging array of circumstances. These teaching laboratories could
also provide a place for investigating and assessing emerging research and
techniques before their general dissemination to state and local forensic
laboratories. These teaching laboratories could also be a useful site for
conducting research on validation, as well as on bias and other human
factors.
Teaching laboratories could also relieve traditional forensic science
laboratories of much of the burden of training. Students emerging from a
clinical instruction program would accumulate significantly more useful
training and experience than current novice applicants for jobs in crime
laboratories. Under the current system, successful applicants undergo
lengthy training programs, some as long as one to three years. Inevitably,
some trainees are poorly suited for the positions, or they discover that the
profession is not for them. The costs of this wash out are high, since several
years and tens of thousands of dollars have often been invested in the
process before the mismatch between trainee and profession becomes
131
A clinical forensic instruction laboratory would reduce this
clear.
inefficient hiring and training practice. Moreover, trainees who had gained
experience through a training laboratory model might gain broader
exposure to a richer variety of real-world circumstances and possibly even
enhanced critical thinking abilities from their hands-on experiences.
C.

Improving the Culture of Forensic Science Journals

To improve the research culture of the pattern identification sciences,
some changes to the current approach to journals and publications are
sorely needed. First, all forensic science journals should insist upon a fullfledged commitment to research norms. Publication in any journal that is
not indexed by at least some of the major indexing services should, in a
sense, not even count as publication. Peer review should be serious, blind,
130.
Indeed, perhaps a procedure could be developed in which a party could, in certain
circumstances, request that a court require such an impartial laboratory to analyze disputed
evidence.
131.
In a case study involving one laboratory, poorly designed hiring procedures led to
attrition costs estimated at roughly $850,000, and estimated lost productivity of nearly $5 million
(because of the loss of sixteen employees). These cost estimates did not include the costs
associated with recruiting, selection, or training. See W. Mark Dale & Wendy B. Becker, A Case
Study of Forensic Scientist Turnover, FORENSIC SCI. COMM. (July 2004),
http://www2.fbi.gov/hq/lab/fsc/backissu/july2004/research/2004_03_research04.htm.
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and carried out by individuals well qualified to assess the research merits of
any given article. While non-research-oriented practitioners can play a
valuable role in peer review as well, evaluations by those with the necessary
qualification to assess the merits and execution of any given study should
dominate the criteria for acceptance. It should also go without saying that
concerns about whether a given set of findings comports with practitioners’
(or researchers’) expectations and desires should not affect publishing
decisions. To be sure, some findings are more interesting or surprising than
others, and this may legitimately affect evaluations of a given article. But
the fact that a research result might alienate or irritate practitioners ought
not to affect publication decisions.
The pattern identification disciplines would also benefit from a
genuine flagship journal that crosses between forensic science itself and
broader research paradigms. Perhaps the JFS, which is already a legitimate
and respected research vehicle, can play this role. However, the pattern
disciplines make up a small part of JFS publications, and the JFS does not
especially focus on the intersections of forensic science with other
disciplines. Whether a new flagship journal focusing on pattern evidence
would be feasible is a difficult question. In an ideal world, such a journal
would link in equal quantities to other forensic sciences and also to other
academic fields, like statistics, cognitive psychology, and electrical and
computer engineering. How to create such a flagship journal is not obvious,
but one place to start would be with a high-powered and interdisciplinary
editorial board that reaches broadly into ancillary disciplines as well as
including leading members of the forensic science research community.
D.

Using Scientific Standards to Guide Casework

Another set of suggestions focuses on efforts to use conventional
scientific standards to guide casework. One key example is “sequential
132
Analysts should have access to all the domain-relevant
unmasking.”
information they need to conduct their inquiry, but they should be shielded
from domain-irrelevant matters unless or until those matters affect the
analysis. A fingerprint examiner, for example, likely does need to know the
surface from which a print was lifted. A fingerprint examiner does not need
to know, however, about the suspect’s confession or his three prior

132.
See Dan E. Krane et al., Sequential Unmasking: A Means of Minimizing Observer Effects in
Forensic DNA Interpretation, 53 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1006 (2008). The basic idea of sequential
unmasking (without the use of that label) was set out in Risinger et al., supra note 49, at 50–51.
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convictions for similar crimes. A document examiner cannot escape seeing
the content of the document being analyzed; however, she need not be told
broader aspects of the prosecution’s theory of the case.
Sequential unmasking creates protocols that protect examiners from
133
From a research culture perspective,
these kinds of biasing information.
sequential unmasking offers two significant benefits. First, it protects
examiners from materials and knowledge that might otherwise have a
134
The enormous literature on bias and
biasing effect on their evaluation.
135
cognition suggests the value of providing such a shield.
Sequential unmasking has another benefit as well. Because it requires
practitioners to think carefully about what information is domain-relevant
and what is not, and why, sequential unmasking also encourages precisely
the kind of careful attention to the relationship between evidence and
warrant that a research culture demands. The very process of thinking hard
and justifying the inclusion or exclusion of certain kinds of information
from an examiner’s purview will be a meaningful step toward the
instantiation of a research culture.
Implementing blind proficiency tests in the stream of casework would
be another way to make casework better comport with scientific principles
for the production of knowledge. Controlled, double-blind studies are the
136
In a double-blind study, practitioners and
gold standard in medicine.
patients do know that they are participating in a research study, but their
potential interpretive biases and expectation effects are reduced because
they do not know if they are receiving the medication being tested or a
placebo. Similarly, proficiency test subjects (and those administering the
test) ideally ought not to know when they are pursuing ordinary casework
and when they are undergoing a proficiency test.

133.
Krane et al., supra note 132. To be sure, sequential unmasking may also increase costs
by requiring an additional layer of personnel to assess what information is domain-relevant and to
ensure that non-domain-relevant information is stripped from the materials the examiner
receives. But given the strong evidence in other fields of the biasing effects of context
information, the onus arguably ought to be on the forensic practitioner community to show why
these costs are not worth incurring.
134.
Dror & Rosenthal, supra note 32, at 902–03; Dror & Charlton, supra note 32, at 612;
Risinger et al., supra note 49, at 45. Note that domain-relevant information may also generate
bias, for example, when a DNA examiner looks at a mixture already knowing the suspect’s profile.
135.
For an overview of some of this literature and its highlights, see generally Risinger et
al., supra note 49.
136.
See, e.g., John Concato, et al., Randomized, Controlled Trials, Observational Studies, and
the Hierarchy of Research Designs, 342 NEW. ENG. J. MED. 1887 (2000); Henry Sacks et al.,
Randomized Versus Historical Controls for Clinical Trials, 72 AM. J. MED. 233 (1982).
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Improving documentation practices in order to increase transparency
is another step to incorporate scientific standards. While the particular
degree of documentation may appropriately vary with the complexity of the
comparison, documentation should be both thorough and transparent. If a
fingerprint examiner, for example, finds additional minutiae on a latent
print after beginning the comparison process, this back-and-forth reasoning
should be clearly noted. Similarly, an examiner should indicate the degree
of confidence (for example, high, medium, low) in the existence of
minutiae or striations or handwriting features in the disputed exemplar in
advance of undertaking any comparison. While careful documentation is
no substitute for the empirical research needed to establish the power and
the limits of various techniques, it can usefully clarify an examiner’s
reasoning process and the basis for any conclusions, and may offer some
137
protections from the potential biasing effect of the comparison process.
E.

Enhancing the “Science” in the Scientific Working Groups (SWGs)

Guidelines and standards for forensic practice in a great many forensic
disciplines are developed and recommended by entities known as Scientific
Working Groups (SWGs), funded by the Department of Justice. Most of
these working groups, which have emerged over the past twenty years,
operate under the auspices of the FBI laboratory. They were designed to
develop best practices, create appropriate technical standards, and improve
138
communications both within and among various forensic disciplines.
Scientific Working Groups exist for firearms and toolmarks (SWGGUN),
friction ridge analysis study and technology (SWGFAST), imaging
technology (SWGIT), DNA (SWGDAM), shoeprint and tire tread
evidence (SWGTREAD), drug analysis (SWGDRUG), as well as for a
number of other forensic disciplines. These organizations have provided
important venues for consensus building, policy development, and
knowledge dissemination.
However, despite the scientific label in the name of the working
groups, SWGs have a rather tenuous relationship with research science.
137.
Glenn Langenburg & Christophe Champod, The GYRO System—A Recommended
Approach to More Transparent Documentation (July 9, 2010) (draft), available at
http://projects.nfstc.org/ipes/presentations/Langenburg_GYRO-System.pdf.
See
generally,
Interpretation Chapter, in NIST/NIJ Working Group Report (forthcoming 2011).
138.
For basic information about the SWGs, see Scientific Working Groups, FED. BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/swgs (last visited Dec. 30, 2010). Several
SWGs operate from locations other than the FBI. SWGRUG operates out of the DEA, and
SWGSTAIN operates out of the Midwest Forensic Resource Center.
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Indeed, some of them previously went by other names. For example,
SWGDAM, the FBI’s DNA advisory group, used to be known as TWGDM,
the technical working group on DNA analysis and methods.
What should a scientific working group worthy of the name look like?
Certainly a legitimate scientific working group would necessarily include
practitioners who could inform the group about best and current practices
in the discipline as well as practical constraints that operate within that
area. These participants would be critical to the proper grounding and
anchoring of a forensic science working group.
However, these
nonresearcher practitioners should make up only a minority of the group’s
total members. The major focus of SWGs should be to ensure that all
recommendations for methods and practices are grounded in research and
validated. When insufficient research exists, SWGs should determine what
research is most critical to assess standards or best practices. Given these
purposes, the bulk of the membership in scientific working groups should be
scientists who have a relevant research background. Indeed, some members
should be scientists outside the forensic discipline of the SWG and some
should come from outside of forensic science entirely. These members will
offer fresh perspectives and help avoid the danger of excessive buy-in to
current practices simply because they are both known and familiar. The
workings of the SWG would thus be driven by scientists and scientific
considerations along with thoughtful input from the practitioners who
would contribute to the formulation and help to operationalize the SWG’s
recommendations. If SWGs were organized in this fashion, they would help
create and perpetuate a research culture, and ensure that forensic science
fields use recommended methods and processes based on scientific
principles and informed by scientific research.
While the membership of the current SWGs varies, most of them are
substantially more practitioner-led than what we have just described. The
working group on friction ridge analysis study and technology
(SWGFAST), for example, is one of the stronger SWGs. Several current
members have serious and significant research interests. But they form only
a small minority of the total membership. On the one hand, given the
paucity of research opportunities and the structure of forensic science, this
limited proportion of research-oriented members is only to be expected.
But in a research culture one would expect—and insist—that the standardsetting, guideline-creating, policy body for any given field be structured so
as to ensure that its decisions are based upon data and research, not simply
the result of a two-thirds vote from a practitioner-dominated working
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To be sure, practitioner-led SWGs may often reach appropriate,
group.
thoughtful, and perhaps even research-based conclusions, but they also risk
being guided by and influenced by populist practitioner pressures. To be
worthy of their name, SWGs need to make certain that scientific findings
and an appreciation for a research culture drive decisions.
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) may take
over the SWGs in the near future; we hope that such a move will
incorporate a major restructuring of how the SWGs operate. If such a move
is merely a change in their funding source from the DOJ to NIST without
significant structural changes, SWGs may be useful as sounding boards for
leading practitioners, but they will continue to have little to do with a
research culture.
F.

Access to Data

Another needed dimension for a robust research culture is access to
data and test subjects. Participation in the research enterprise must
obviously be balanced against a laboratory’s other needs, and a laboratory
may be unable to participate in every research project asked of it. However,
access to data—exemplars and databases—should not be limited to
practitioners at a given laboratory. With appropriate precautions for
protecting confidentiality and the necessary input of Institutional Review
Boards, forensic laboratories, as well as institutions like the FBI and state
and federal criminal justice authorities, should make data available to
140
qualified researchers to the maximum extent possible.
To create incentives for providing this access, participating as research
subjects ought to become an accreditation requirement for forensic labs.
Just as many law schools have implemented pro bono requirements for
students, the American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors Laboratory
Accreditation Board (ASCLD-LAB) should require that every laboratory
devote a given number of hours to participation in research. The details of
how to structure such a requirement could be worked out in a variety of
139.
For SWGFAST’s bylaws, as an example, see Bylaws, SCIENTIFIC WORKING GROUP ON
FRICTION
RIDGE
ANALYSIS,
STUDY
&
TECH.
(Sept.
15,
2009),
http://www.swgfast.org/Resources/Bylaws_3.2-Corrected.pdf.
140.
This has been an ongoing issue in DNA analysis as well. For example, researchers have
unsuccessfully endeavored to access anonymized DNA profiles from the United States National
DNA Index system, controlled by the FBI. See D. E. Krane et al., Time for DNA Disclosure, 326
SCIENCE 1631 (2009). Yet, some researchers have had access to databases for other countries. See
David H. Kaye, Trawling DNA Databases for Partial Matches: What Is the FBI Afraid of?, 19
CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 145, 161–65 (2009).
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ways. Perhaps every employee should be allowed a modest number of paid
work hours for participation as a “test subject” in the research study of her
choice; or perhaps laboratories should create more structured systems for
participation. Whatever the details, the point is to create workable
mechanisms to encourage research participation by sometimes wary
laboratories. To be clear, laboratories themselves would not necessarily
spearhead these research projects. Rather, analysts would be made available
as test subjects, consulting on the feasibility of certain research endeavors,
providing feedback on what research questions would have practical payoff
for laboratories, and creating partnerships with researchers both from
within and from outside the forensic sciences.
G.

Managing the Tension Between an Adversarial Culture and a
Research Culture

The fact that the pattern identification fields and other forensic
sciences are embedded within the legal system has made it difficult for a
research culture to flourish. Numerous commentators (and the NAS
Report) have criticized the institutional connections between the police,
the prosecutors, and the crime laboratories. Indeed, the NAS Report, like
some scholarship that preceded it, explicitly calls for making crime
141
laboratories independent of these other domains.
Clearly structural risks of both bias and partisanship stem from the
institutional location of crime laboratories.
Several scandals have
illustrated the dangers raised by forensic scientists who may feel pressured to
142
Partisanship is a serious
provide prosecutors with what they are seeking.
143
and
and long-recognized danger for all kinds of expert witnesses,
operating as part of the institutional apparatus of law enforcement may
144
Additionally, the strong
make practitioners unconsciously partisan.
institutional links to police investigators may compromise efforts to protect
examiners from access to unnecessary, and potentially biasing, contextual
141.
NAS REPORT, supra note 8, at 183–84; Paul C. Giannelli, The Abuse of Scientific
Evidence in Criminal Cases: The Need for Independent Crime Laboratories, 4 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L.
439, 470–73 (1997); Roger Koppl, How to Improve Forensic Science, 20 EUR. J. L. & ECON. 255,
258 (2005).
142.
See, e.g., Locke & Neff, supra note 5.
143.
See, e.g., Samuel R. Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 1113; Jennifer L.
Mnookin, Expert Evidence, Partisanship, and Epistemic Competence, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 1009
(2008).
144.
David E. Bernstein, Expert Witnesses, Adversarial Bias, and the (Partial) Failure of the
Daubert Revolution, 93 IOWA L. REV. 451, 456 (2008).
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information about the case. To be sure, there may also be benefits from the
current institutional location, ranging from possible efficiency gains from
police authority over forensic science, to motivational gains for forensic
scientists who may benefit psychologically from being part of law
enforcement. And of course, any institutional location has its own set of
145
costs and benefits that would need to be compared to the current set.
Most, but not all, of us believe that institutional separation of
laboratories from the law enforcement apparatus would be tremendously
beneficial for reducing the dangers of partisanship and fostering a research
culture. However, most, but not all, of us also believe that even if this is
indeed a worthy and highly desirable goal, it is also unlikely to be realized in
the near future. One small but constructive step toward creating at least a
modicum of psychological distance between laboratories and the implicit
(or, sometimes explicit) pressures from law enforcement would be a
requirement that all laboratories perform a certain quantity of defense-side
work, enabling analysts to gain experience in a different role vis-à-vis the
146
adversary system.
However, the problematic dynamics of adverarialism and their
potentially pathological effects on a research culture go beyond the
sometimes-too-cozy prosecutor-police-forensic-science relationship. The
dynamics of the courtroom and of the adversarial process itself can create
significant incentives for analysts to resist the collection of information or
the production of data that might assist their adversary or weaken their own
credibility. If any documented error is likely to haunt an examiner on every
subsequent cross-examination, there may be little motivation to identify or
audit mistakes. If difficult proficiency tests would potentially provide
extensive fodder for defense attorneys, why would examiners risk shooting
themselves (or the prosecutors with whom they work) in the foot by
attempting to determine the limits to their own abilities?
We do not have any simple fixes for this set of structural difficulties,
but we offer two suggestions. First, we would suggest that laboratories
145.
See Dror, supra note 25, at 101–02.
146.
At present, not only do most state laboratories not regularly conduct testing for the
defense, but policies about whether state laboratory workers can consult for the defense in other
jurisdictions vary. One recent controversy in Minnesota illustrates the depth of adversarial norms.
When a medical examiner consulted for the defense in a case in another county, the prosecutor in
her home county complained to her boss, causing the medical examiner to fear for her job. While
the prosecutor later apologized and was reprimanded for his behavior, the incident captures the
conceptual partisanship frequently seen in the field—the notion that state forensic science
workers are tied to the prosecution. See Joy Powell, Dakota County Prosecutor Reprimanded by State
Board, MINNEAPOLIS-ST. PAUL STAR TRIBUNE, May 19, 2009.
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consider extending something akin to Brady duties to examiners
147
themselves. Under Brady v. Maryland, prosecutors have an ethical duty
to report exculpatory evidence to defense attorneys. Brady has already been
extended to information in the possession of agents of the prosecution such
148
as the police, and there is no reason that this should not apply to forensic
scientists. While a forensic scientist may have a legal duty to disclose
exculpatory evidence to a prosecutor, courts have not held Brady duties to
extend directly from the forensic scientist or police to the defense. What
would be the consequences of an ethical obligation of forensic scientists to
disclose directly to the defense any exculpatory findings or any interlaboratory disagreement regarding conclusion or interpretation? Perhaps
more robust reporting requirements, in which an analyst routinely discloses
any interpretive disagreement within her laboratory report, would be a
simpler means to achieve a similar goal. The purpose of either a disclosure
requirement or enhanced reporting norms is in part to increase the degree
of perceived and subjectively felt independence from law enforcement,
even if no formal institutional realignment takes place. At a minimum, a
research culture should mean clear and robust expectations about
transparency and documentation: Reports should carefully detail steps
taken, findings reached, and internal disagreement (if any) about the results
or the interpretation.
A second idea worth considering is whether there ought to be a
protective evidentiary privilege that attaches to self-critical investigation
and analysis in at least some circumstances. This presents an extremely
difficult question of balancing competing goals. Creating a privilege that
protects a laboratory from having to disclose what it learns through the
investigation of an error may lead to much better error investigation that
may in turn reduce future errors. But in the particular case, this benefit
would come at the expense of keeping highly relevant, potentially
exculpatory material from defendants. Although some courts have
recognized a self-critical analysis privilege in the medical peer review
context (which faces structurally similar issues, though typically in a civil
rather than criminal setting), it is quite unlikely that courts would extend it
to the criminal domain, in significant part because of the criminal
defendant’s constitutional due process right to exculpatory information.
Nonetheless, it may be worth considering whether there are any
feasible mechanisms through which defendants’ legitimate (and, in some
147.
148.
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instances, constitutionally mandated) need for information could
appropriately be balanced against efforts to promote self-analysis and
research. It is difficult to imagine a privilege that would protect a
laboratory from the disclosure of an error in actual casework. But what if a
laboratory wanted to test its examiners’ proficiency on difficult and close
nonmatches? Should it be able to protect itself from having to report their
results? Should a researcher be protected from having to identify the
laboratories that participated in a study? Or which individuals achieved
what results? To what extent should some kind of research privilege protect
both researchers and laboratories in order to remove one major impediment
to cooperation, when the results do not directly implicate any particular
case or defendant?
Finally, we believe the fear that admitting imperfections might
significantly harm jurors’ understanding and appreciation of the pattern
identification sciences may be largely chimerical. It is not clear that jurors
would substantially discount conclusions from forensic science examiners
even if they were presented with information quantifying error rates greater
than zero; even if they knew that this particular examiner had made an
occasional mistake on proficiency tests; and even if they knew that a socalled match did not necessarily mean that every other human being (or
bullet, or tool) in the world could be excluded as a potential source.
Certainly mitochondrial DNA evidence—which cannot ever, standing
alone, individualize because maternal relatives share the same
mitochondrial DNA—can significantly contribute to a successful
prosecution. Particularly in those cases in which the pattern identification
evidence was combined with other probative evidence suggesting guilt, it is
hardly obvious that these caveats with regard to the pattern identification
149
And in
evidence would have any significant impact on juror reasoning.
149.
This is, of course, an empirical question. We can, however, make some guesses from
the literature on how jurors weigh expert testimony. See, e.g., Valerie P. Hans et al., Science in the
Jury Box: Jurors’ Comprehension of Mitochondrial DNA Evidence, LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
(forthcoming 2010); David H. Kaye et al., Statistics in the Jury Box: How Jurors Respond to
Mitochondrial DNA Probabilities, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 797 (2007); Jonathan J. Koehler et
al., The Random Match Probability in DNA Evidence: Irrelevant and Prejudicial?, 35 JURIMETRICS
201 (1995); Dawn McQuiston-Surrett & Michael J. Saks, Communicating Opinion Evidence in the
Forensic Identification Sciences: Accuracy and Impact, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1159 (2008); Dawn
McQuiston-Surrett & Michael J. Saks, The Testimony of Forensic Identification Science: What Expert
Witnesses Say and What Factfinders Hear, 33 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 436 (2009); Dale A. Nance &
Scott B. Morris, An Empirical Assessment of Presentation Formats for Trace Evidence With a Relatively
Large and Quantifiable Random Match Probability, 42 JURIMETRICS J. 403 (2002); Dale A. Nance &
Scott B. Morris, Juror Understanding of DNA Evidence: An Empirical Assessment of Presentation
Formats for Trace Evidence With a Relatively Small Random-Match Probability, 34 J. LEGAL STUD.
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those rare cases where the pattern identification evidence stands largely
alone, perhaps a greater degree of skepticism would be epistemologically
warranted.

CONCLUSION
Our purpose in writing this Article has been to bring together a group
of practitioners and academics who have all spent time thinking hard about
forensic science, to see if we could find consensus about how to improve the
field.
Although many of us inhabit overlapping intellectual and
professional circles, we did not all know each other beforehand, and we
come from a variety of different intellectual traditions and locations. This
project therefore began as something of an experiment. Its origin was at a
conference held at UCLA in February 2009, on the one-year anniversary of
the release of the NAS Report. After the public symposium, sponsored by
the UCLA School of Law’s Program on Understanding Law, Science, and
Evidence (PULSE), this group of coauthors gathered for an intense, daylong brainstorming session.
As we discussed, outlined, and argued, we discovered that our views
150
Indeed, we found
had more in common than one might have expected.
that in many important respects, our views of what forensic science most
needed significantly converged.
We all believe that the NAS Report got far more right than it got
wrong. We all believe that many forms of forensic science today stand on
an insufficiently developed empirical research foundation. We all believe
that forensic science does not yet have a well-developed research culture.
These disciplines, in our view, need to increase their commitment to
empirical evidence as the basis for their claims. Sound research, rather
than experience and training, must become the central method by which
assertions are justified. While there can indeed be a legitimate role for
experience-based claims of knowledge, such claims need to be both put
forward with appropriate epistemic modesty and assessed through feedback
mechanisms. The answer to the question “How well can you do what you

395 (2005); Jason Schklar & Shari Seidman Diamond, Juror Reactions to DNA Evidence: Errors
and Expectancies, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 159 (1999); Jonathan J. Koehler, If the Shoe Fits They
Might Acquit: The Perceived Value of Shoeprint Testimony (Sept. 13, 2010) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with UCLA Law Review).
150.
Jerry Kang also participated in our day-long session and used MindManager to “map”
our conversation in real time. Both our brainstorming process and the drafting of this Article
were greatly assisted by his tremendous mind-mapping skill.
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say you can do?” is more properly answered by blind proficiency tests than
by reference to experience or training. The forensic sciences need to
increase their commitment to transparency along a variety of dimensions—
from increasing the documentation provided in complex cases; to more
readily sharing data with researchers; to increasing access to protocols and
standard procedures; to acknowledging and learning from errors. In
addition, the pattern and impression fields, as well as other forms of forensic
science, need to develop and sustain an ongoing critical and reflective
stance, in which yesterday’s truths can be revisited tomorrow.
We have offered a number of suggestions for ways to develop and
improve a research culture in these fields, but we are frankly more confident
in our diagnosis than in our specific suggestions for possible cures. We are,
however, unanimous in hoping and believing that this is a rather special
historical moment, a time when cultural change in forensic science—even
151
perhaps, a genuine “paradigm shift” —is possible. Perhaps, just perhaps,
the very fact of our writing this Article together provides a small piece of
evidence that this change has already begun.

151.
Michael J. Saks & Jonathan J. Koehler, The Coming Paradigm Shift in Forensic
Identification Science 309 SCIENCE 892, 895 (“[W]e envision a paradigm shift in the traditional
forensic identification sciences in which untested assumptions and semi-informed guesswork are
replaced by a sound scientific foundation and justifiable protocols.”). For the classic discussion of
paradigm shifts in science, see THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS
(2d ed. 1970).
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